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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 1981, twelve year old Sheila Pointer was raped and bludg-
eoned to death.' The crime was witnessed by her ten year old brother
Purvy Pointer, who was beaten unconscious in the attack. When detec-
tives interviewed the semi-comatose Purvy in his hospital bed, he said his
assailant was a teen-aged gang member named "George" who lived near
the Pointer home and had lighter skin than Purvy. George's last name, it
seemed from Purvy's indistinct murmurings, was "Anderson" or "Hender-
son" or "Harrison." The police were unable to locate anyone with those
last names in the Pointers' neighborhood. However:
They discovered that GeorgeJones lived a block away. A senior at Fenger
High School, and the editor of the school newspaper, the bespectacled
Jones was called "Bookworm" by his classmates in grudging tribute to his
studious character. He was the son of a Chicago policeman and planned
to join the Air Force upon graduation from high school and afterward
attend college.2
Jones was not a gang member, nor was his skin lighter than Purvy's.
Police presented Jones's photograph with other mug shots to Purvy.
Purvy said he knew Jones, but he was unresponsive when asked if Jones
was the assailant. The next day police returned and repeated the photo
lineup, in the course of which Purvy identified Jones's photo as that of
the assailant, but Purvy did not respond when asked if he knew the per-
son's name, or nickname, or whether it was "Bookworm." The police ar-
rested Jones. They subsequently showed his photograph to another
witness, Nancy Coleman, who after some uncertainty identified it as a
likeness of the person whom she had seen leaving an alley by the victim's
residence shortly after the crime. Jones was then brought to Purvy's bed-
side. When asked whether Jones was the assailant, Purvy answered, "No,
that's not the man, that's not the man, no, no, no." Jones was brought
even closer and his glasses were removed. When asked again, Purvy said
"No," then, "Yes, that's him, yes"; then 'Yes, no, yes, no" over and over.
The next day the grand jury indicted Jones for murder, rape, and
other crimes. Meanwhile, the police prepared an official arrest report,
which was later described byJudge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals as "full of falsehoods," such as:
1. The facts described throughout the Introduction are drawn fromJones v. City
of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988) and Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560
(7th Cir. 1985).
2. Jones, 856 F.2d at 988.
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that Nancy Coleman had picked out Jones's picture from a group of
seven (his picture was the only one she had been shown), that Jones's
father had not seen him on the morning of [the crime] (in fact his father
had told the investigating officers that he had seen George at home that
morning), and that Purvy had said that his assailant attended Fenger
High School (Purvy had said no such thing).3
In addition, the report omitted several important exculpatory facts:
The report did not mention that Purvy had described his assailant as a
gang member.., as being a lighter-skinned black than Purvy ... and as
having a name like Anderson. The report also did not mention that the
doctors had warned the officers at least twice that Purvy's head injury had
left him with serious memory problems.4
Nor did the report mention Purvy's conflicting responses at the identifi-
cation procedures.
The prosecutor used the report to persuade the court to set a
$250,000 bond. This resulted in George Jones spending a month in jail,
where he fought off a rape attempt and suffered other abuse before the
bond was reduced sufficiently for -his family to bail him out.
Prospects were gloomy for Jones when, at the start of his murder trial,
the prosecution announced an intent to seek the death penalty. Purvy
testified at the trial, positively identifying Jones as the assailant. But the
trial had a Hollywood ending:
[Purvy's] testimony... appeared in the Chicago Tribune and caught the
attention of Detective Frank Laverty, a member of the CPD [Chicago Po-
lice Department] who participated in the original investigation ....
Purvy's testimony directly conflicted with Laverty's theory of the case,
which he had presented to his supervisors [seven months before trial],
that a Lester Pique was the assailant. After reading the newspaper article,
Laverty immediately contacted the defense counsel and informed him
that 'he had written ... two reports-two separate memos on two sepa-
rate occasions' concerning the investigation .... The defense counsel
had not received either of these reports in response to the subpoenas
served upon the CPD or the discovery motions filed with the [prosecu-
tor's] office. As a result, the defense counsel not only subpoenaed the
specific reports, but called Laverty to the witness stand and examined
him in the presence of the state court judge.5
Laverty's reports undermined Purvy's identification of Jones. For exam-
ple, six days after Jones's arrest, Laverty learned that not one, but two
assailants had committed the crime, both wearing stocking masks. When
he asked Purvy how he recognized "George Anderson" when the assail-
ants were masked, Purvy broke down and cried. The reports also incul-
pated Pique, who confessed to a similar rape-murder committed near the
Pointer home. Pique went by the nickname of "King George," was a gang
3. Id. at 990.
4. Id.
5. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1985).
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member, had lighter skin than Purvy, and had made incriminating state-
ments to Laverty about the Pointer crime.
When Laverty told his findings to the detectives in charge of Jones's
cases, they warned him not to interfere. When he said he might testify
for Jones if the case went to trial, one detective threatened to "blow him
away" if he did.6 As Judge Posner speculated, these detectives "had a
hunch [Jones] was guilty and were not going to let a mere absence of
evidence stand in their way." 7 Laverty's supervisors refused to have Purvy
view a lineup including Pique, suppressed Laverty's reports, and led him
to believe that the case against Jones would be dropped.
After hearing Laverty's testimony, the trial judge declared a mistrial.
The prosecutors nolle prossed all charges against Jones.
POLICE REPORTS
George Jones's ordeal was the product of, and in turn sheds light
upon, police practices of investigating crimes and writing reports. Writ-
ten police reports of criminal incidents and arrests8 give details such as
the time, place, and nature of criminal conduct; the names and addresses
of victims and witnesses; physical characteristics of the perpetrator(s) or
arrestee (s); weapons used; property taken, recovered, or seized from the
arrestee; and injuries to persons and property. Through their reports,
the police "have fundamental control over the construction of [the] 'facts'
for a case, and all other actors (the prosecutor, the judge, the defense
lawyer) must work from the framework of facts as constructed by the po-
lice."9 This control depends upon the faith of "other actors" that police
reports are basically objective and reliable. False reports, and reports that
omit crucial exculpatory' 0 information, undermine this trust. By "excul-
patory" information I mean:
6. Jones, 856 F.2d at 990-91.
7. Id. at 993. When Laverty protested the prosecution to his commander, the
latter replied that ifJones was innocent, the jury would acquit him. See also Palmer v.
City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.
1985), describing another case in which detectives omitted from their report an eye-
witness identification of the fleeing perpetrator that was dissimilar to descriptions
given by the prosecution witnesses, noting in explanation: "We did not put this in the
[report] because it would just cloud the issue."
8. Hereinafter referred to as "police reports." Many other kinds of reports by
police exist in addition to these. See generally LocAL Gov E zwr POLICE MANAGE-
MENT ch. 20 (Bernard L. Garmire ed. 1977); ORLANDO W. WILSON, PoLicE REcORDs:
THEIR INSTALLATION AND USE 41-68 (1942).
9. Richard V. Ericson, Rules For Police Deviance, in ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE DEVI-
ANCE: ITS STRUcrURF AND CONTROL 96 (Clifford D. Shearing, ed. 1981) (discussing
the police in Ontario, Canada).
10. An incomplete report might also misstate or omit important inculpatory facts,
resulting in dismissed charges or unwarranted leniency to the defendant. See, e.g.,
Sean P. Murphy, Several Probes May Have Ignored Evidence Against Police, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 28, 1991, at 1, 18 (discussing several cases in which internal police investigators
[Vol. 28:1
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any fact, circumstance, or item of evidence actually emerging in the
course of investigation before or after arrest, other than mere protesta-
tions of innocence, which tends to suggest a criminal suspect's inno-
cence, or to raise doubt concerning his guilt or as to the reliability or
inculpatory nature of other facts or circumstances. 11
Created primarily to serve various internal needs of the police depart-
ment,12 police reports are also used in the criminal process. They influ-
ence criminal proceedings in many ways, affecting a defendant's fate even
in cases that never go to trial. False and misleading reports injure the
process as well as the defendant. In the nine months I recently spent
working as a public defender in "City One,"'3 I was surprised and dis-
turbed by the apparent frequency of such reports. Afterwards, I was left
with a number of troubling questions: How typical was my experience?14
Should we expect police reports to reflect all of the relevant facts avail-
able to them, orjust the inculpatory facts? Should police reports be "neu-
tral" documents, or opening salvos in the coming adversary battle, shaped
by a strategic bias in favor of the prosecution? If the police should, but
under current practice do not, report "all the relevant facts" they know,
what can be done to change the system? And by whom?
Courts and legal scholars have given much attention to the prosecu-
tor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence at formal stages of the criminal
process, but very little attention to the "dark no-man's-land"' 5 of police
discretion to report the same evidence. This article asks why false and
concluded that no excessive force was used, but in which civil claims were paid. In
one case, five bus passengers complained to police that an officer had beaten the
driver; the internal investigator never contacted the five witnesses, but his report
cleared the officer. In another case, the report credited an officer, accused of wrong-
ful shooting, who said he saw the victim holding a "shiny metal object"; the report did
not mention six civilian witnesses who said they never saw a gun).
11. Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Liabiliy of Police or Peace Officers for False
Arrest, Imprisonment, or Malicious Prosecution as Affected by Claim of Suppression, Failure to
Disclose, or Failure to Investigate Exculpatory Evidence, 81 A.L.R. 4th 1031, 1035 & n.5
(1990). Under some circumstances, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence can vio-
late the defendant's constitutional right to due process. See infra text accompanying
notes 215-23.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28.
13. "City One" (pop. 500,000) is located in the Northeast. My prior practice ex-
perience, also in the Northeast, included prosecution in the lower criminal courts,
defense ofjuvenile delinquency clients, and part-time teaching and supervision in my
law school's criminal clinic.
14. As a public defender working primarily in a lower criminal court, most of the
reports I encountered were prepared by patrol officers, i.e., officers who typically re-
spond to perceived or reported criminal activity, make arrests, and write reports.
MicHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE S Elur 6-7 (1981). These types of reports should
be distinguished from reports prepared by detectives or other specialists to whom
serious cases requiring further investigation are referred, and from reports of investi-
gations supervised by prosecuting attorneys. Both latter categories, and especially the
last, would normally be more detailed than initial response reports.
15. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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misleading police reports are produced, how they affect the criminal pro-
cess, and how they are regulated. In Part II of this article I explore the
chief reasons for misleading police reports: deliberate deception and a
lack of incentive to report exculpatory evidence. In addition to pursuing
these topics in the literature, I made modest attempts to gather empirical
information on two questions. First, was my experience of unreliable po-
lice reports shared by other local practitioners, or was it unique to my
court or caseload? To discover this, I administered a questionnaire to a
small number of police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, predomi-
nantly in City One and in an adjoining county, to explore their views and
perceptions about the reporting of exculpatory information. The re-
sponses to these questionnaires are discussed below.16 My second effort,
also modest, was designed to learn whether police officers are trained to
include exculpatory facts in police reports. To this end I examined train-
ing materials from six police departments in several jurisdictions, and
supplemented this information by personal interviews with some training
personnel. The fruits of this limited foray into the police academies are
also discussed.' 7
Part III of this article reviews the negative impact of misleading police
reports on criminal defendants, and Part IV considers remedies. I use
Jones v. City of Chicago,'8 discussed above, and a related Seventh Circuit
case, Palmer v. City of Chicago,19 as well as cases from my own practice, to
illustrate the damage done by false or one-sided reports, and the scope
and limitations ofjudicial and administrative remedies. These cases show
both the criminal justice system's dependence on police investigation and
reporting practices, and the relative imperviousness of these practices to
legal remedies. Part V summarizes my findings and proposes actions that
police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys should take to ameliorate the
problem.
II. THE REASONS FOR MISLEADING REPORTS
A. Introduction
Police reports may mislead by misstating facts, omitting facts, or a
combination of both. Numerous explanations for such police behavior
could be given. Carelessness aside,20 the two most convincing explana-
16. See infra text accompanying notes 107-31, apps. A & B.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 132-55.
18. 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
19. 562 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1983), reo'd, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985). Jones
and Palmer are discussed in Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater
Factor An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv. 75, 101-
02 (1992).
20. See infra note 163; cf. Orfield, supra note 19, at 101 (in study of police perjury
to evade the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, some respondents attributed
vague and inaccurate case reports to police laziness and sloppiness).
[Vol. 28:1
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tions are deliberate deception, and a police stake in limiting reports to
inculpatory facts, omitting "doubts and details."21 Although I will discuss
both causes, I do not mean to equate, either quantitatively or morally,
lying and the omission of exculpatory evidence. The former is surely less
common than the latter. And while some police mightjustify both behav-
iors as necessary to serve "higher" values,2 2 the failure to report exculpa-
tory evidence is subject to an additional legitimating claim: "it's not my
job."
Police reports are produced in a three-step process: investigation, re-
cording, and reporting. In a model of completely objective and reliable
reporting, the police would investigate and record all relevant evidence,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory; preserve the recorded information;
and report it in clear, objective terms to the proper recipients. Depar-
tures from objective, reliable reporting could be plotted on a continuum:
reporting fabricated evidence of guilt at one extreme, and omitting to
report exculpatory evidence at the other. At intermediate points on the
continuum the police, once in possession of some inculpatory evidence,
might fail to investigate exculpatory leads, or fail to record or preserve
exculpatory evidence known to them. Ultimately, the failure to pursue
exculpatory leads is crucial, because evidence that is not discovered can-
not be reported. However, this article does not directly address the duty
to investigate.2 3 It focuses, rather, on the reporting of relevant informa-
tion actually known to the police.
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND THE FUNCTION OF POLICE REPORTS
The ideal treatment of exculpatory evidence in police reports de-
pends upon the perceived function of such reports, which in turn de-
pends upon one's viewpoint. The police viewpoint differs from that of
prosecutors,24 judges, and other actors in the criminal process.
For the police, the report is primarily an "internal memorandum"25
serving the perceived needs of the police department. Reports provide
the department with information needed to determine the nature and
21. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENLAL OFJUsTIcE 58 (1977).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33 and 69-79.
23. For discussion of the defendant's right to a more complete police investiga-
tion, see Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation: A Step
Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 835 (1978) [hereinafter Toward a Constitutional Right to
an Adequate Police Investigation]; Herald P. Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady? 9
GiM. L. BuL. 325, 326 (1973) (arguing for police duty "to conduct an impartial
investigation and collect all the evidence relating to the commission of an offense").
24. The police use different measures to define "success" than professional prose-
cutors; this causes some tension in their relationship. See 4 Donald M. McIntyre, Im-
pediments to Effective Police Prosecutor Relationships, 13 AM. CRim. L. REv. 201 (1975);
Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor, 15 AM. J. CiuM. L. 197, 208-09
(1988). The prosecutorial viewpoint is discussed infra at text accompanying notes
262-75.
25. WErNRB, supra note 21, at 48.
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type of follow-up investigations, to solve other crimes, and to guide alloca-
tion of resources for future law enforcement. The department also uses
reports to evaluate personnel, and to generate data required for FBI Uni-
form Grime Reports. For the individual officer, the report form serves as
an investigative tool, guiding the officer's conduct of the initial investiga-
tion. Later, the report serves to refresh the officer's recollection in prep-
aration for court testimony.2 6
When an arrest is made, the report's primary function for the police is
"to justify the arrest and clear the case." 27 This can be achieved by con-
fining reports to what is necessary to satisfy the probable cause standard,
ignoring exculpatory evidence. For example, in a robbery case hinging
on the victim's identification of the arrestee, the victim's intoxication or
discrepant original description of the assailant would be irrelevant unless
they actually negated probable cause.28 This minimalist approach serves
two police interests not directly shared by the prosecutor: resource con-
servation and self-protection.
RESOURCE CONSERVATION
In busy police departments, officers are under severe time pressure to
respond to calls, leaving them little time to investigate or to write re-
ports.2 9 For example, City One officers are given only twenty minutes to
write an incident report, and must ask their supervisor for extra time if
needed.30 In addition to requiring more time to compose, a more com-
plete report might require the police to conduct a more extensive, time-
consuming investigation, and to record more information. This would
take time that might otherwise be used to perform tasks that are, from
the police standpoint, of higher priority.
SELF-PROTECTION
Detailed investigations and reports, especially if they revealed exculpa-
tory facts, might cast doubt on the arrestee's guilt, thus exposing the po-
26. The purposes of an incident report include "[t] o examine the past, keep other
officers informed, continue investigations, prepare court cases, provide the court with
relevant facts, coordinate law enforcement activities, plan for future law enforcement
services or to evaluate performance." City One Police Academy, Introduction to Inci-
dent Reporting (unpublished training materials of City One Police Department) (on
file with author) [hereinafter City One Introduction to Incident Reporting].
27. WEINREB, supra note 21, at 48. If no arrest has been made, the report serves to
communicate sufficient information to guide further investigation. Both the report
and the officer's "field notes," see infra text accompanying notes 134-35, are used to
refresh the officer's memory before testifying.
28. See infra text accompanying note 204.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99.
30. Interview with anonymous report writing instructor, City One Police Acad-




lice to potential embarrassment or even civil liability for false arrest.31
Aware of how attorneys might discover their reports and put them to hos-
tile use, police have a negative incentive to report exculpatory facts.
PARTISANSHIP
A narrow approach also serves a third interest which prosecutors do
share: partisanship. This refers to an interest in punishing the guilty,
coupled with a psychological stake in believing that a particular suspect
or arrestee is ("factually")32 guilty. Reports that include exculpatory facts
might lead to the acquittal of such persons, whereas reports limited to
inculpatory evidence increase the government's chances to win the adver-
sary contest.3 3 A victory, in turn, also protects the police, because a con-
victed defendant will find it difficult to win a civil suit for false arrest or
imprisonment.3 4
The following discussion of police deception and of the police incen-
tive to limit reports to inculpatory facts shows the importance of these
overlapping police concerns.
B. Police Lying and Deception
Deliberate35 deception in reports can take two forms. A report might
contain a deliberate lie,36 or it might deliberately omit exculpatory facts.
By definition, a report that contains a lie will also mislead by omitting
exculpatory facts, i.e., those that expose the lie. But the converse is not
31. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
32. See infra text accompanying note 69.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 146-54. Some reports are written before any
particular individual is arrested or suspected. In such cases the police have no incen-
tive to slant the report against the defendant. In other cases, police might include
exculpatory information in a report, for whatever reason, as a signal to the prosecutor
to "kill" the case.
34. Federal circuits split on whether the fact of conviction necessarily bars relief.
See MTCuAEL AVERY & DAVID RuDovsxv, PoLIcE MIscoNDucT § 2.3(a) (1992).
35. A police report might be termed "inaccurate," "misleading," or even "decep-
tive" without necessarily implying that the maker intended or knew of its defects.
Although "knowing" but "unintentional" deceit might be considered "deliberate," for
the sake of simplicity I exclude that category here.
36. Scholars define "lying" differently. See Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception
and Lawyers: Away from a Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Decep-
tion, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722 n.1 (1989); SissELA BoK, LYING 14-17 (1978). I use
"lie" to mean a "statement intentionally uttered to deceive." Carl B. Klockars, Blue
Lies and Police Placebos The Moralities of Police Lying in 4 POLICE & L. ENFORCEMENT 131
(1987). Police lying in written reports does not necessarily constitute the crime of
perjury, which is defined as "a false oath in ajudicial proceeding in regard to a mate-
rial matter." Id. at 133; see also RoLrN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw
511 (3d ed. 1982). Police reports might not be sworn, but it might be a crime to
make a false police report. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268, § 6A (West 1990).
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true: a report that deliberately deceives by using half-truths, omitting ex-
culpatory facts, might contain no lies.3 7
How often, in what circumstances, and why the police write deliber-
ately deceptive reports in order to "make" or strengthen the case against
an arrestee is not easily ascertained. 38 Neither my academic career in
criminal law and procedure,3 9 nor my experience as a prosecutor,40 pre-
37. See ERNEsrJ. HoPKINs, OuR L-,WLEss PoLICE 280 (1931) ("Failure to tell 'the
whole truth' is a type of routine perjury.").
38. As discovered by the prosecutors who failed to convict Los Angeles police
officers for filing false police reports to cover up the beating of motorist Rodney King,
an officer's deliberate deception, as opposed to good faith inaccuracy, is difficult to
establish. See People v. Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 20, 1992) (LEXIS,
Cal Library, LAPD file) (Closing Arguments). In some instances, an inaccurate re-
port might result from unconscious reconstructions of memory that serve the wit-
ness's psychological needs. See EuzAB= F. LoFrus &JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEwrrNEss
TEmSTIMO. Cnr AND CRrmAL § 3.08 (1987). Without a confession of deceptive
intent, good faith errors of recall are very difficult to distinguish from lies. But such
errors are more likely to occur in later testimony than in police reports, which are
typically prepared soon after the reported observations.
39. I have taught in this field since 1964. Law professors are not likely to focus on
questions of lying and distortion in police reports. Court opinions, law review articles,
and teaching casebooks treat mainly the roles of lawyers in the system. To the extent
they focus on police lying, legal scholars treat police lying and distortion in discrete
contexts, such as evasion of the various exclusionary rules, and not as a pervasive
feature of police behavior. Despite the obvious connection between police suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence and the prosecutor's failure to disclose such evidence,
the law treats disclosure primarily as an obligation of the prosecutor, not the police,
and focuses on disclosure issues primarily as they affect the rarely reached trial stage.
See infra text accompanying notes 218-23.
40. I spent a sabbatical year (1982-83) as an Assistant District Attorney in a subur-
ban county near Boston. My changed perspective as a result of working as a public
defender suggests that what you see depends significantly on where you stand. Profes-
sor Richard Uviller, a former prosecutor, calls police perjury the "demon in the crimi-
nal process." He writes:
We all know it's there, lurking just outside the radius of proof .... [It] is
extremely elusive, almost impossible to identify with certainty in a particular
instance. Suspicion, sometimes amplified by skepticism, is the best perjury
detector we have been able to devise-the best only because it is virtually the
exclusive index of whether a sworn police officer is telling the whole truth.
H. RicHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 111 (1988).
This passage mirrors my own experience as a prosecutor. Lacking the resources
(if not the incentive) to conduct an independent investigation of the facts, and with-
out access to the defendant, a prosecutor who suspects police witnesses of lying is left
with only suspicion and skepticism. Except for matching the officer's account against
the accounts of other witnesses and using common sense, the prosecutor is largely
stuck with the facts as reported by the police. In contrast, the "defense view" of police
lying and deception reflects not only a partisan bias-which undoubtedly affects one's
"standard of proof"-but also greater exposure to the problem. A defense attorney
has access to information which a prosecutor lacks: clients (and investigators) some-
times produce persuasive corroborating witnesses not listed on the police report; sub-
poenaed Police Department tape recordings of 911 calls and police radio broadcasts
are another-objective-source of facts, not always known to the prosecutor. In-
[Vol. 28:1
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pared me for the extent of apparent deception I encountered as a public
defender. Court decisions and legal scholarship present an image of po-
lice deception that is troubling, but that is confined to discrete contexts
such as undercover investigations, 41 manipulative interrogation of sus-
pects,42 and efforts to defeat Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary
rules.43 Thus, deceptive practices appear as aberrations from a norm of
dependent investigation of the facts inevitably gives greater awareness of police decep-
tion to defense attorneys than to prosecutors.
Differences in the timing of preparation may also give defense counsel greater
exposure than prosecutors to police deception. As a defense lawyer, due to prompt
investigation, I sometimes knew of deception in the police report before the probable
cause hearing took place. The prosecutor typically knew nothing about the case until
the hearing date, and prepared only if the prosecution witnesses showed up. If, as
often happened, the victim or police officers did not appear, the case might (after
one or more continuances) be dismissed without the prosecutor ever learning of the
deception. The same might be true in cases disposed of by plea negotiation: defense
counsel might take the "deal" without sharing evidence of police deception with the
prosecutor. Unless defense counsel expects disclosure to be followed by some reme-
dial action, there is little incentive to educate the prosecutor. However, remedial
action is quite unlikely and might, in any case, expose both counsel and the client to
retaliation.
Myron Orfield's study of police, prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge percep-
tions of police lying to avoid suppression under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule confirms the point. Although all groups believed that the police falsified docu-
ments and testimony some of the time, public defenders reported more frequent oc-
currences than the others. See Orfield, supra note 19, at 98 & n.103 (12/14 (86%) of
public defenders believed that police perjury hindered deterrent efficacy of exclu-
sionary rule, but only 7/11 judges and 1/13 prosecutors agreed). Similar discrepan-
cies were reported regarding the perceived frequency of: fabrication in police
reports, id. at 100 & nn.113-14; deceptive applications for search warrants, id. at 105 &
n.138; and police perjury at suppression hearings, id. at 107 & nn.147-48. See also infra
text accompanying notes 116-31.
41. See Katherine Goldwasser, After ABSCAM: An Examination of Congressional Pro-
posals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75,
76-77 (1987).
42. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966); Welsh S. White, Police Trick-
ery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. Rxv. 581 (1979).
43. See generally Orfield, supra note 19. Orfield's interviews with Chicago police,
lawyers, and judges lend a discomforting degree of support to Alan Dershowitz's
twelve "Rules of the Justice Game," half of which concern police lying:
Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution
in order to convict guilty defendants.
Rule V: All prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV.
Rule VI: Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie about whether
they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants.
Rule VII: All judges are aware of Rule VI.
Rule VIII: Most trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know
are lying.
Rule IX: All appellate judges are aware of Rule VIII, yet many pretend to
believe the trial judges who pretend to believe the lying police officers.
ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, THE BEsr DEFENSE XXI-XXII (1982).
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police truthfulness.44 Social scientists who have studied the police paint a
different picture. 45 Their studies suggest that lying-to suspects, to
judges, to members of the public, and to one's own superiors-is an inte-
gral feature of urban police work, a "subcultural norm rather than an
individual aberration."46 If true, this is an important datum in assessing
the accuracy and reliability of police reports. It is therefore relevant to
consider the circumstances and motivations that produce police decep-
tion generally.
Social scientists have developed taxonomies to describe police decep-
tion.47 Peter Manning draws a useful distinction between "internal" and
"external" lies. "Internal" lies are those told to fellow officers and mem-
bers of the police hierarchy; "external" lies are those told to manipulate
members of the public. Following this terminology, lies in police reports
are both "internal" (because they involve false internal documents) and
"external" (because they are also meant to manipulate the judicial
system).
INTERNAL Lrus
That police in criminal proceedings regularly commit perjury is well
known to criminal lawyers, judges, and others familiar with the criminal
44. To some, these practices are understandable, if not pardonable, tactics in the
battle against crime. See, e.g., UviLLER, supra note 40, at 116-18. Although Professor
Uviller condemns police perjury, he "cannot confidently contradict the idea that
some varieties of perjury, if not exactly virtuous, are less treacherous than others." Id.
at 116-17. Perjury designed merely to get around the exclusionary rules, he points
out, appears morallyjustified to "[rn] any morally-even religiously-dedicated cops,"
while justifications for the exclusionary rules appear to them "not entirely convinc-
ing." Id. at 118.
45. See generally BROWN, supra note 14 (study of three southern California police
departments: Los Angeles, Inglewood, and Redondo Beach); HoPrNs, supra note 37
(discussion of the Wickersham Commission's reports on the New York City Police
Department); Klockars, supra note 36 (discussion of the types of police lying); Peter
K. Manning, Police Lying, 3 URB. LIFE & CuLTuRu 283 (1974) (based in part on re-
search on the London Metropolitan Police); JoHNTHAN RUBsnsTEN, Cnrv POLICE
(1973) (study of the Philadelphia Police Department); POLICE CoRRuPrION: A Socio-
LOGICAL PERSPECTrW (Lawrence W. Sherman ed., 1974) (compilation of descriptive
and analytical research on police corruption); JERoME H. SKOLmCKJusTrICE WrHoUr
TIAL (1966) (study of an anonymous American city's police department) [hereinaf-
ter SKOLNmci, JUsTICE WrrHoUT TRIAL].
46. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception By Police, Cram. JusT. ETHics 40, 42-43 (1982)
[hereinafter Skolnick, Deception By Police]. Based on his observations of one urban
police department, Professor Skolnick calls police lying a "routine way of managing
legal impediments-whether to protect fellow officers or to compensate for what [the
policeman] views as limitations the courts have placed on his capacity to deal with
criminals." Id. at 43.
47. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 45, at 286; Klockars, supra note 36, at 134. At
times in this section I follow the usage of the non-legal literature, which tends to
discuss "lying" and "perjury" rather than the broader term, "deception."
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justice system.48 That they just as regularly deceive others in the police
bureaucracy may be less well known. Patrol officers49 have been de-
scribed as "bureaucrat[s]" enmeshed in a "system of administrative rules,
policies, and managerial controls designed to ensure conformity to ad-
ministrative directives." 50 These regulations cover a broad spectrum of
police practices ranging from such mundane matters as sick days, lunch
breaks, 51 and required equipment for patrol cars, 52 to crucial matters like
corruption.55 They are enforced by both formal and informal internal
disciplinary measures. Because it is difficult or impossible to comply with
all of these regulations and, at the same time, to accomplish the core
tasks that both the public and the police hierarchy expect patrol officers
to perform, "manipulation, secrecy, and avoidance" [of internal disci-
pline] become necessary to the patrol officer's survival.5 4 Such survival
tactics entail lying, both to protect oneself and, in deference to the code
of loyalty that prevails in police subculture, to protect fellow officers.
55
48. Fred Cohen, Police Perjury: An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CaIm. L. BULL.
363, 367 (1972) (" [A]mong all the lawyers that I know-whether they are into defense
work or prosecution-not one of them will argue that systematic police perjury does
not exist. We may differ on its extent, its impact.., but no trial lawyer that I know
will argue that police perjury is nonexistent or sporadic."). A lie often requires more
lies to cover up the first. For a classic instance of lies piled one on the other, forming
a structure of deception too unwieldy to stand, see Commonwealth v. Lewin, 542
N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 1990); Larry Wentworth, Comment, The XYZ Affair of Massachusetts
Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Curious Case of Commonwealth v. Lewin-Was Dismissal
Warranted? 25 Nrw ENG. L. Rxv. 1019 (1991).
49. See supra note 14 for a definition of "patrol officer."
50. BROWN, supra note 14, at 8, 28. For an explanation of the rationale for such
detailed controls over individual officers, see id. at 87-93.
51. RuBINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 43.
52. In Philadelphia, for example, all patrol cars are required to carry fire hydrant
wrenches. See id. at 107 (officers responding to open hydrant complaint deceived
radio dispatcher in order to conceal their failure to comply with this regulation).
53. Regulations forbidding police from accepting illegal favors are widely flouted.
See THE KNAPP COMMISSION, REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPIrON 170 (1972); RUBiNSTEIN,
supra note 45, at 43. Rubinstein attributes police corruption in part to the political
nature of decisions allocating scarce police services in the face of limitless demand.
Id. Just as the mayor, to retain the residents' political support, orders the police to
issue parking tickets in certain areas of the city, so the police go out of their way to
"keep an eye" on restaurants that serve the police free or discounted meals. Id. at 406-
10.
54. BROWN, supra note 14, at 291. See also Manning, supra note 45, at 292, 299.
55. William Westley found that 77% of police officers questioned would perjure
themselves rather than testify against another officer. WILLIAM A. WESTLE=, VIOLENCE
AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORArr" 151 (1970).
See also R. E. Ewin, Loyalty: The Police, 9 CIuM. JusT. ETHics 3 (Fall 1990); Ellwyn R.
Stoddard, A Group Approach to Blue-Coat Crime, in PoLICE CoRRM'ION: A SOCIOLOcI-
CAL PERSPECTvE 289 (Lawrence W. Sherman ed., 1974). Tests of a rookie's loyalty to
other police officers often include accepting payoff money. EDwINJ. DELAITR, CHAR-
ACTER ANm Cops 82-83 (1989).
For an extreme, and hopefully rare, example of lying to avoid internal discipline,
see Joseph Berger, A False Report, Racial Issues and Officers Lose Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
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Nor are these tactics confined to patrol officers. In one police depart-
ment studied, "every supervisor violates [the] regulations to produce the
conditions and circumstances which enable him to get the required work
from his men .. "56
Another feature of police work that fosters lying-both internal and
external-is the pressure on patrol officers to produce "activity" (such as
arrests, traffic stops, or parking tickets) that will demonstrate to the pub-
lic that the department is "doing something" about crime.57 This motiva-
tion applies to police work generally, but vice law enforcement is
especially problematic. If a police department relies on ordinary patrol
officers (as opposed to specialized vice units) to enforce laws against gam-
bling, prostitution, and illegal drugs, then the patrol officer experiences
relentless pressure to produce vice "activity."58 Unless satisfactory quanti-
ties are produced, an officer is cut off both from prospects for promotion
and valuablejob "perks,"59 as well as from lucrative overtime pay for court
appearances. 60 But to produce, the officer must engage in freelance ac-
tivities (location, cultivation, and protection of informants) that are not
only inconsistent with regulations governing daily activities, but are
steeped in secrecy, deception, coercion, and corruption. "Every patrol-
man," according to one observer, "learns that he must be a liar and a
conspirator if he wants to remain a district policeman. He must become
an expert in telling untruths or transfer to a unit that has no vice-work
obligations."61
Apr. 24, 1993, at 1, 26 (to cover up a fistfight between Yonkers police officers which
resulted in serious injuries, police broadcast a false report describing a "tall black man
in a bluejacket and sneakers" as the white officer's assailant. Five officers who alleg-
edly participated in the false report were disciplined and a sixth resigned).
56. RuBINsrEN, supra note 45, at 43. Rubinstein describes the preparation of
false search warrants as a routine, open, "collective enterprise," in which police super-
visors select officers skilled in perjury to obtain warrants. Id. at 386-88; see also Orfield,
supra note 19, at 108-09.
57. "Activity" is defined as the "internal product of police work. It is the statistical
measure" by which police performance is judged internally and, ultimately, by the
public. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 44. The system for measuring "activity" rewards
officers who make large numbers of arrests, car stops, or "ped stops," regardless of
quality. Id. at 44, 45, 210-11, 377-78.
58. Id. at 381.
59. Id. at 43.
60. A super-active vice detective in the City One court where I worked reportedly
made over $100,000 a year in overtime pay.
61. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 388. The need to produce vice activity fosters
intense competition among officers to find and protect "their" informants. "[Tihe
relationships among colleagues in a squad are anything but harmonious and trust-
ing." Id. at 438. Some police falsify evidence of "activity" by reporting a stop they




"The police subculture permits and sometimes demands, deception of
courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants .... ,"62 Police
also lie in a variety of circumstances to manipulate ordinary members of
the public, including citizen complainants and crime victims. 63 As with
internal lying, officersjustify deception in terms of the need to safeguard
competing values that are perceived as superior to truth-telling.64 Justifi-
cations for external lying include the maintenance of order,65 self-protec-
tion, and the apprehension and punishment of the "guilty." The latter
two justifications are likely to affect the writing of police reports.
LIEs FOR SELF-PROTECrION
Police lie to protect themselves against civil liability for false arrest or
the use of excessive force. For example, in charges arising from the infa-
mous Rodney King beating, police were prosecuted for falsifying reports
to exaggerate Mr. King's resistance to arrest and to understate the
amount of force used to subdue him.66 Also, the police frequently lodge
false "cover charges" of assault and battery against an arrestee whom they
have injured by the use of excessive force. Paul Chevigny has described
this as "[1]ying to cover a mistake and [using] a criminal charge to buttress
the lie .... -"67 Officers also fabricate evidence of crime by innocent per-
sons in order to satisfy the demand for "vice activity." 68
LIES TO ENSURE CONVrGTION OF THE "GUiTW'
The given justification for much police lying is to convict and punish
"factually guilty" suspects in the face of obstacles that-but for police de-
62. SKOLNIC, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 45, at 76.
63. Manning, supra note 45, at 286; Klockars, supra note 36, passim.
64. See, e.g., SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHoUr TRIAL, supra note 45, at 93 ("The detec-
tive measures the costs of the act of lying against the benefits to the crime victim and
the general public.").
65. Manning, supra note 45, at 294;'Klockars, supra note 36, at 135-36.
66. For example, the reports stated that the police repeatedly struck Mr. King
with a baton on the "arms, legs, and torso," but omitted mention of the many blows-
apparent on the videotape-to his head. See People v. Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal.
Super. Ct. April 20, 1992) (LEXIS, Cal. library, LAPD file) (Closing Argument for the
Prosecution, First Close by Attorney Terry White). The defendant officers were ac-
quitted of this charge.
67. PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEwYoRK Crrv 143 (1969);
BROWN, supra note 14, at 80-81; Manning, supra note 45, at 297-98. Frequently, in this
situation, the authorities offer to drop the criminal charges if the defendant agrees to
waive all civil claims against the police. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386
(1987) (release must be informed and voluntary). But see Foley v. Lowell Div. of Dist.
Court, 501 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (Mass. 1986) (disapproving practice under state law).
68. See, e.g., ALLAN N. KORNBLUM, THE MORAL HAzARDs 80 (1976) (describing
New York City practice of "flaking," when police plant evidence on suspects to meet
"norms of production").
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ception-might "unjustly" defeat the prosecution's ability to convict.6 9
As Jerome Skolnick has written, "the policeman will... lie to get at the
truth."70 Under this broad category of deception one might distinguish
several sub-categories, including: (a) deceptive investigative techniques,
such as the use of undercover agents71 and deceptive questioning of sus-
pects;72 (b) lies to facilitate evasion of Fourth Amendment limitations on
police investigative powers, including the fabrication of legal grounds to
conduct searches and seizures,73 and the preparation of false applications
for search warrants;74 (c) perjured testimony to avoid exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence, including "dropsy" testimony,75 and false testi-
mony about police questioning or the circumstances of an identification
procedure; (d) lies to "improve" a weak substantive case,76 such as false
testimony about a defendant's incriminating conduct 77 and statements; 78
(e) lies that inculpate innocent persons for the purpose of forcing them
69. On the distinction between "factual guilt" and "legal guilt," see Herbert L.
Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). See also UVLER,
supra note 40, at 115-16 (characterizing police perjury to avoid exclusion of illegally
seized evidence as "[a] slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an unwieldy con-
stitutional constraint and obtain ajust result.").
70. Skolnick, Deception By Police, supra note 46, at 42.
71. See generally GARY T. MARx, UNDERcovER (1988).
72. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interroga-
tion, 11 CRIM. JuST. Emics 3 (1992).
73. For example, an officer who suspected gambling activity in a private home
generated "probable cause" for a warrantless "exigency" entry and search of closed
containers by telephoning an anonymous false "report of gunshots" at that address.
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 122-23.
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewin, 542 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 1989); Wentworth,
supra note 48.
75. See sources cited infra note 282. Perjured "plain view" testimony has been
called "indoor dropsy testimony." Cohen, supra note 48, at 372.
76. Uviller calls this "artificial evidence" of guilt. UvLLER, supra note 40, at 117.
For a shocking example, see Jon Nordheimer, Trooper's Fall Shakes Both Police and Pub-
lic, N.Y. Trms, Nov. 15, 1992, at 41, 56, and Third State Trooper Arrested in Evidence-
Tampering Case, N.Y. TimS, May 1, 1993, at 29 (two New York State Police investigators
pleaded guilty to deliberately falsifying forensic evidence in more than 20 criminal
cases between 1988 and 1992. The two "waited for other investigators to identify a
suspect and then claimed they had found that suspect's fingerprints at a crime scene."
The Lieutenant supervising their investigations was also charged.).
77. Drawing on the report by the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement in 1931 (the Wickersham Commis-
sion), Ernest Hopkins described "routine perjury" of police making up evidence to
secure the conviction of persons believed guilty. HoplmNs, supra note 37, at 280-81.
For a contemporary account, see Cohen, supra note 48, at 367 (If a defendant held an
officer by the arm, it comes out as "a stranglehold around my neck.").
78. In the District of Columbia, a rash of police testimony of defendants' sponta-
neous apologies to victims during police-supervised confrontations was criticized by
Judge Skelly Wright in Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542, 542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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to inform against the guilty,79 or to punish them for other crimes which
the police suspect but cannot prove.
CONCLUSION
Lying and deception are widely practiced in police work. This ac-
counts for some of the reports that exaggerate the evidence of a suspect's
guilt, but probably for only a small number as compared to those attribu-
table to the omission of exculpatory evidence. Despite the apparent "ac-
ceptability" of lying in the police subculture, common experience
suggests that sins of omission are easier to justify, and less stigmatic, than
those of commission. More important, as will appear below, neither the
police nor external agencies expressly require the officers to report excul-
patory evidence. As a result, writifng a one-sided report is not necessarily
inconsistent with "good police practice."
But deliberate police deception and the practice of excluding excul-
patory evidence from police reports are related in two ways. First, if deci-
sion makers are educated in the great variety and extent of workaday
police deception, they might view police reports more skeptically. A
judge who treats the report as a one-sided, partisan document will be
more open to defense claims of innocence than one who regards the
report as neutral and objective. Second, if the police were required to
report certain objective, potentially exculpatory facts, such as the victim's
sobriety, inconsistent witness statements, or alibi evidence, a false report
would require the officer to increase the number of specific false re-
sponses subject to disproof. This might deter false reports by making
them easier to detect, and reduce the incentive to falsify later reports or
testimony.80
C. The Place of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports: Police Norms and
Practices
This section explores the place of exculpatory evidence in police re-
ports. I review three sources of knowledge about police reporting norms
and practices: scholarship on police investigation, responses to our ques-
tionnaire, and police training materials. From these, I draw two conclu-
sions. First, it is difficult to know how police treat exculpatory evidence.
American police departments are so numerous and decentralized, and
operate under such widely varying conditions of size, location, workload,
and training, that any generalizations are hazardous. This is especially
true of generalizations about police investigatory and reporting practices,
which until quite recently were little studied, and then not with a focus
79. "'Farming,' the planting of evidence, is practiced throughout the depart-
ment." RuBINsmN, supra note 45, at 390. Some officers will plant drugs or numbers
slips on a person believed vulnerable to pressure to inform on others. Id. at 390-91.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 254-59.
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on exculpatory evidence. 8' Given the first conclusion, the second is nec-
essarily tentative: most police probably82 do not generally report exculpa-
tory evidence. While giving lip service to formal departmental policies
requiring "complete" investigations and reports of "all relevant facts,"
many, if not most, police follow "working rules" that prefer minimal in-
vestigations and reports limited to inculpatory facts.
1. Scholarship on Police Investigation Practices
Scholars have approached the subject of police investigation from at
least three perspectives: comparative criminal justice, the rights of crimi-
nal defendants, and law enforcement. Regardless of perspective, their
scholarship supports the view that police reports do not normally contain
exculpatory facts.
In the first group are scholars who argue the comparative deficiencies
of our system of criminal investigation. For example, in his 1977 book,
Professor Lloyd Weinreb criticized the American criminal process for fail-
ing to base convictions on adequate investigation of the facts.83 He ar-
gued that the police are primarily dedicated to keeping order. They are
neither trained nor equipped to conduct more than quick, superficial
criminal investigations. If a patrol officer makes an arrest, the report
tends to include only sufficient facts to justify the officer's actions.8 4 Nor,
he argued, do prosecutors or defense counsel take up the investigative
slack. With the exception of very serious or unusual cases, many defend-
ants enter negotiated guilty pleas on the basis of inadequately developed
accounts of the relevant facts.85 Weinreb's proposed solution was to
transfer criminal investigatory functions from the police to a new, conti-
nental-style office of investigating magistrate which would conduct a
"neutral, complete and convincing" investigation of all relevant evidence,
including exculpatory evidence.85
Although not disagreeing with Weinreb's diagnosis of the problem, a
second group of legal scholars have focused on the harm caused defend-
ants by the lack of access to exculpatory evidence.87 Their proposed solu-
81. JOHN E. EcK, POLIcE ExEcUTI RESEARCH FORUM, SOLVING CmMEs: THE IN-
VESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY 2 (1983) [hereinafter EcK, SOLVING CRIUMES];
LocAL GOVERNMENT PoLIcE MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 211-12.
82. With the understanding that all general descriptions of police practices here-
inafter below are subject to the same qualification, I will stop using "probably."
83. WEINREB, supra note 21, at 48-49. See also Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination
of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1224 (1932).
84. WEINREB, supra note 21, at 48.
85. Id,; see infra text accompanying notes 193-94.
86. WEINREB, supra note 21, at 48. Weinreb's solution has not been received
warmly. See, e.g., Philip E. Johnson, Importing Justice, 87 YALE L.J. 406 (1977) (review-
ing LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977)); Norval Morris, Book Review, 91
Hanv. L. REV. 1367 (1978).
87. See DanielJ. Capra, Access to Exculpatoy Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FoRDHAM L. Rxv. 391, 408 (1984)
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tions build on the defendant's existing constitutional rights, such as the
Brady due process right of access to exculpatory evidence known to the
government,8 8 and Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation,8 9 compul-
sory process,90 and the effective assistance of counsel.91 According to
some, these rights not only guarantee defendants access to exculpatory
evidence in the government's possession, but support the more funda-
mental right to a police investigation that gathers and preserves poten-
tially exculpatory evidence in the first instance.92
The non-legal literature on police science provides a third, more em-
pirically based perspective. A number of government-sponsored studies
of police investigation practices have been conducted during the past two
decades.93 In contrast to the legal scholars mentioned above, these au-
(proposing in camerajudicial review of prosecutor's file as means of enforcing defense
right of access); Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation, supra
note 23, at 836.
88. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), discussed infra at text accompany-
ing notes 215-35;Jay Y. Bostic, Comment, Due Process and Section 1983: Policemen's Duty
to Expose Exculpatory Information, 22 WAxE FOREST L. REv. 235, 246-47 (1987) (propos-
ing recognition of police duty under Brady to "expose" to the prosecution evidence
that the officer subjectively recognized as exculpatory); see also Barbara Allen Bab-
cock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counse4 34
STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1163-74 (1982) (Brady and Agurs necessitate high standards for
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and adequate support services for de-
fense attorneys to ensure access to exculpatory evidence).
89. Although the Supreme Court has rejected the view that the Confrontation
Clause protects the defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence, Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-61 (1987), some Justices disagreed. See id. at 61-66 (Black-
mun, J., concurring); Id. at 61-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 567 N.E.2d 943, 951-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (right to confrontation en-
dangered where officer testified entirely on basis of admittedly selective notes, con-
fined to defendant's incriminating statements, excluding any exculpatory statements
that defendant might have made); Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police
Investigation, supra note 23, at 846-47.
90. The Supreme Court has not decided whether the Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process requires the government to produce exculpatory evidence. See
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (issue "unsettled"). In support of the
argument, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 711 (1974); United States v.
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969); Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Po-
lice Investigation, supra note 23, at 844-46; Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 121-23 (1974).
91. Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation, supra note 23, at
843-44.
92. See sources cited supra note 23.
93. These have been funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
of the Department of'Justice. The literature includes ECK, SOLVING CRIMEs, supra note
81; JoHN E. Ecn, MANAGING CASE ASSIGNMENTS: THE BURGLARY INVESTIGATION DECI-
SION MODEL REPLICATION (1979); ILNE GREENBERG & ROBERT WASSERMAN, NATIONAL
INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUST., MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
(1979); PETER W. GREENWOOD, ET. AL., THiE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1977);
NATIONAL INST. OFJUSTICE, ARREsTs WrrHouT CONVICTION: How OFTEN THEY OccUR
AND WHY 244 (1983) [hereinafter ARRES WrrHour CONVICTION] ; ToNY PATE, ET AL.,
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thors express no concern for innocent defendants who risk the conse-
quences of sloppy or incomplete investigations. On the contrary, they
focus upon investigation practices as they affect police efficiency and con-
viction rates. 94 Naturally, studies examining the adequacy of efforts to
gather and report inculpatory evidence shed only indirect light on police
practices relative to exculpatory evidence. Also, for various reasons, the
law enforcement studies do not afford a basis for confident generaliza-
tion.95 Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the conclusion that
the police typically confine investigation and reports to brief statements
of inculpatory evidence.
The law enforcement studies describe police investigatory practices as
inadequate. Lacking better "objective" measures, the public tends to eval-
uate police investigation by the number of crimes "cleared" rather than
by the number of resulting criminal convictions.96 This encourages the
police to devote primary attention to their order-maintenance duties: re-
sponding to incidents promptly, restoring order, and leaving. Patrol of-
ficers in busy departments are under constant time pressure to respond
to new citizen calls.9 7 Therefore, they conduct minimal investigations at
the scene, 98 focusing on the "solution" of cases by identifying and arrest-
ing a suspect.99 If no arrest is made, a follow-up investigation, if any, is
left to detectives, who-facing a cold trail-may be hampered by defi-
ciencies in the initial report.100 Patrol officers and detectives are rela-
tively unconcerned with questions such as whether sufficient evidence
THREE APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL APPREHENSION IN KANSAS CrT:. AN EVALUATION RE-
PORT (Police Foundation, 1976); JOAN PETERSilA, ET AL., THE RAND CORP., POLICE
PERFORMANCE AND CASE ATTRITION (1987). For a brief critical history of the literature,
see id. at 5-6. The major two year study, conducted by the Rand Corporation, is dis-
cussed in GREENWOOD, supra.
94. See, e.g., GREENBERG & WASSERMAN, supra note 93, at 4.
95. Among other difficulties, the studies tend to rely on small, sometimes self-
selected samples.
96. See, e.g., LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 211; McIn-
tyre, supra note 24, at 226. For purposes of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, "clear-
ance" is defined as at least one person arrested, charged with commission of the
offense and turned over to court for prosecution. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 163 (1990). The concern with clear-
ance filters down to the patrol officer, who may be evaluated on the basis of street
'activity," see supra text accompanying notes 57-61, even though scholars argue that
clearance rates are a poor measure of investigative efficiency. See GREENWOOD, supra
note 93, at 225-29; LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 211.
97. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
REPORT ON POLICE (1973) (Commentary to Standard 24.1, "Police Reports"); THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 56 (1967).
98. LocAl GOVERNMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 211-12.
99. William F. McDonald, Prosecutors, Courts, and Police: Some Constraints on the Po-
lice Chief Executive, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 203, 207-08 (William A. Geller
ed. 1985); ARu sTs WITHOUT CONVICTION, supra note 93, at 244.
100. See LoCAL GOVERNMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT, supra note 8, at 164-67, 218.
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exists to file a charge, go to trial, or gain a conviction. 1° 1 Those worries
belong to the prosecutor.
The relative indifference of the police to post-arrest proceedings re-
sults in inadequate police investigation and the loss of crucial inculpatory
evidence.10 2 To remedy these problems, some departments have experi-
mented with new methods to improve the quality of police investigations
and reports. These include giving patrol officers more time and training
to conduct thorough investigations, team policing, and increasing police-
prosecutor communications. 10 3 But, without incentives for police depart-
ments to change, some doubt that reforms will succeed.' 04
The widely recognized inadequacy of police investigation practices to
serve basic law enforcement goals has strong implications for police treat-
ment of exculpatory evidence. If, generally, the police are insufficiently
trained, equipped, and motivated to gather and report crucial inculpa-
tory evidence, then, absent circumstances that cast extreme doubt on the
existence of probable cause, 10 5 they are unlikely to spend time investigat-
ing exculpatory leads and recording the exculpatory facts in their posses-
sion. 10 6 Doing so would consume scarce resources and threaten police
interests in self-protection and punishment of presumptively guilty
individuals.
101. See PETERsnUA, supra note 93, at 41 ("the department feels that it is being
asked to 'solve crimes.' A solution occurs when an arrest is made. What happens
after that is, by law, the responsibility of other agencies."); see also WErNmRB, supra note
21, at 48, accord. But see Orfield, supra note 19, at 82, 85-90, distinguishing in eviden-
tiary suppression cases between patrol officers, who have relatively little interest in
what happens after the arrest, and detectives or police serving in specialized units,
who care about convictions. Orfield also distinguishes between police attitudes of
indifference toward the success of prosecution in "little" cases (which usually involve
patrol officers) as opposed to "big" cases (usually involving detectives or specialized
units). Id. at 85-90.
102. See PErERsIUA, supra note 93, at 5; ARRES WrrHoUT CONVICTION, supra note
93, at 218-20, 244-45.
103. SeeEcu, SOLVING CRIMES, supra note 81, at 26-29; P=rRs=UA, supra note 93, at
5-6; GREENBERG & WASSERMAN, supra note 93, passim.
104. See PETERSILA, supra note 93, at 5, 41-42; see also GREENBERG & WASSERMAN,
supra note 93, at 6-7. But cf. EcK, SOLVING CRIMES, supra note 81, at 28 (increasing
investigatory role of patrol officers can increase clearance rates).
105. The fact that the police severely doubt the alleged victim's credibility may not,
in the police view, suffice. Professor Uviller's study of New York City police showed
that the police were unsure whether they possessed the power to resolve credibility
issues against a complainant, and were reluctant to do so in deciding whether to
arrest. H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call, 47
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20-21 (No. 4 1984).
106. WENREB, supra note 21, at 132 (police investigation is "not seriously con-
cerned to uncover information that might ambiguously cast doubt on their
conclusions").
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2. The Questionnaire
To learn whether my experience of police reports was shared by
others, written questionnaires, loosely modeled on the facts of a case I
had defended, 0 7 were administered to a small number of defense attor-
neys' 08 in the same "City One" court where I had practiced as a public
defender, and to a small number of defense attorneys, 0 9 prosecutors, 110
107. The questionnaire is contained in Appendix A, infra. In the actual case, po-
lice officers responded to a mid-afternoon radio call about a man with a gun. The
victim told them that three unknown black males had robbed him with a hand gun,
and one had punched him in the face. The three had fled on foot with his wallet
containing $100 and personal papers. Ten minutes later my client, Mr. Bowman, was
stopped in the courtyard of a public housing project adjacent to the robbery scene.
Police officers brought the victim there and, according to the police report, he identi-
fied Bowman as the assailant who had punched him in the face. According to the
booking sheet, Bowman had no gun, money, or other property belonging to the vic-
tim when arrested.
Bowman insisted to me that he had nothing to do with the alleged robbery, and
that the victim appeared to be very intoxicated. According to Bowman, the arresting
officer told him that he knew Bowman had not done it, that the victim probably
would not show up, and that the judge would let him go.
The 911 recordings revealed that the victim, obviously very drunk, had called from
a public telephone. His speech was slurred, rambling, and non-responsive to the op-
erator's attempt to elicit basic information. Although he was calling in broad daylight
from a pay telephone located on a major downtown avenue, just outside the entrance
to a large supermarket, and in full view of street signs and prominently marked build-
ings, he was unable to tell the exasperated operator where he was, or to describe any
visible landmarks. Finally traced to the location with the help of the telephone com-
pany, he was able to describe only one of his three assailants. Bowman's age and
clothing differed sharply from the description.
The police report failed to mention the victim's intoxicated condition or his hazy
description of his assailants. Nor did it describe either the victim's original broadcast
description of his assailants or the defendant's clothing when arrested: spaces in both
his report and the booking sheet for describing, respectively, the perpetrator's "spe-
cial characteristics (including clothing)" and his "scars, marks, [or] other descriptive
data" were left blank.
At the scheduled probable cause hearing a month later, the victim failed to ap-
pear. The arresting officer confided to me that the victim was very drunk at the time
of the incident, but that his identification of Bowman had put the officer in "a bad
position," forcing him to arrest Bowman. He predicted that the victim would never
show up. Over my objection, the case was continued for two more weeks to give the
prosecution another chance to bring in the victim. At the next court appearance,
again without the victim, the prosecutor told the court he did not expect ever to be
ready for trial, and the case was dismissed.
108. I mailed or handed these questionnaires directly to approximately eight pub-
lic defenders and four private bar attorneys whom I knew. Ten completed question-
naires were mailed back to me. All questionnaires in the survey were completed
anonymously.
109. Six questionnaires were mailed to public defenders and seven to private de-
fense attorneys. Seven completed questionnaires were returned.
110. I sent ten questionnaires to the county District Attorney, who solicited cooper-
ation from prosecutors on his staff. Eight completed questionnaires were returned to
me by individual prosecutors.
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and "City Two" police officers"' in a neighboring county ("County
Two"). It was also administered to a small number of police officers
("Quantico class") from different states and localities attending a course
at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia." 2
The questionnaire asked whether police reports "usually, sometimes,
or rarely" would contain seven potentially exculpatory facts: the victim's
initial description of the perpetrator, the victim's intoxication, the names
and addresses of bystanders who witnessed the incident, a description of
the defendant's jacket and cap when arrested, names and addresses of
two persons in the defendant's company at the time of arrest, the defend-
ant's alibi statement to the police, and the companions' statements cor-
roborating the alibi. For each fact, respondents were also asked whether
police reports should contain the information. Finally, those respondents
who said that the police would not usually report any of the specified
facts were asked to indicate why they thought that was so.
Although the questionnaire was designed to check my own percep-
tions rather than to produce scientifically reliable data about police re-
porting practices and attitudes, the responses revealed three striking
patterns. Most surprising was the near-unanimous opinion of the po-
lice, 113 as well as of the prosecutors and defense counsel, that police re-
ports should contain all of the specified information." 4 For example,
ninety-four percent (16/17) of the police respondents said that the re-
port should contain the alibi statements made by the defendant and his
witness at the arrest scene, as well as the names and addresses of the two
persons defendant was with when arrested; eighty-eight percent (15/17)
said it should contain the victim's initial description of the perpetrator,
names and addresses of witnesses, and a description of the defendant's
clothing; and eighty-two percent (14/17) said that it should mention the
victim's intoxication.115
111. City Two is the largest city (pop. 85,000) in a mostly suburban county (pop.
616,000). The lieutenant in charge of training distributed ten questionnaires to of-
ficers in the City Two department, and returned eight completed questionnaires to
me.
112. Eleven of the thirteen officers in the class completed the questionnaires, from
which I eliminated two completed by foreign nationals. The Quantico class respon-
dents were all police administrators or supervisors of the sergeant rank, with substan-
tial prior field experience.
113. These included both the County Two police and the Quantico class. In gen-
eral, the responses of the two police groups to all questions were substantially similar.
See Tables infra accompanying notes 121-30 and in Appendix B.
114. In County Two, 93% of the polife, 100% of the prosecutors, and 98% of the
defense attorneys said that police reports should contain all of the specified informa-
tion. 98.75% of the City One defense lawyers, and 86% of the Quantico sample
agreed.
115. See infra Appendix B, Table: Combined Police Responses: County Two and Quantico
Class. All of the prosecutors and all but one defense attorney thought that all of the
facts should be included.
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Also striking was the consistent pattern of disagreement between the
different groups about whether, in practice, exculpatory facts would be
reported. Typically, the police were most likely to say that the report
would contain exculpatory details, and defense counsel were least likely
to say so. Prosecutors were generally in between, agreeing with the police
about some exculpatory facts and with defense counsel as to others.116
Thus, on average for the seven hypothetical facts, eighty-three percent
of the County Two police respondents said that the report would "usu-
ally" contain the information. 117 The comparable figures for County Two
prosecutors were forty-eight percent, and for County Two defense attor-
neys, thirty percent.
Finally, City One defense attorneys consistently expected to find less
exculpatory information in reports than defense attorneys in County
Two. This tended to confirm my own experiences with City One police
reports, and to suggest that police reporting practices differ in different
departments." 8 As one County Two defense attorney commented,
"[d]ifferent police departments report arrests differently. The [City One]
Police Department gives almost nothing, whereas [smaller] towns write
dissertations .... " In fact, City One officers, who in some areas write up
to twenty incident reports a night, are given only twenty minutes to write
an incident report, and must ask their supervisor for extra time if
needed." 9 By comparison, City Two patrol officers write two or three
incident reports in the same period, and have at least until the end of
their shift to complete the reports.' 20 Thus, heavier demands on the po-
lice in a larger city leave less time for writing detailed reports.
The following illustrative table gives responses to three of the seven
questions by all County Two respondents and by City One defense
attorneys:
116. For the reasons why defense attorneys would experience more one-sided re-
ports, see supra note 40.
117. The comparable average for the Quantico class was 86%.
118. For a more detailed comparative study of reporting practices in two jurisdic-
tions, see infra text accompanying notes 268-72.
119. Interview with City One writing instructor, supra note 30.
120. Interview with anonymous training instructor, City Two Police Department, in
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Defense (100%) (14%) (57%) (29%)
Counsel
City One 10/10 0 3/10 7/10
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WOULD IT BE INCLUDED?
(YES) 1T
PEOPLE SHOULD BE







City Two Police 8/8127 7/8128 1/8129 0130
(100%) (87.5%) (12.5%)
City Two 8/8 2/8 6/8 0
Prosecutor (100%) (25%) (75%)
City Two 7/7 0 4/7 3/7
Defense (100%) (57%) (43%)
I Counsel
City One 9/10 0 0 10/10
Defense (90%) (100%)
Counsel
In sum, the questionnaire responses suggest that: (1) police subscribe
formally to the norm that reports should include exculpatory facts; (2) in
the police view, their conduct substantially conforms to the agreed norm;
and (3) in the view of prosecutors and defense attorneys, police practice
substantially departs from that norm, to a greater or lesser extent de-
pending upon the department and the respondent's role in the system.
That police might articulate a policy and practice of reporting all the
relevant facts, including exculpatory facts, while neglecting to do so in
practice, is understandable in light of their training, to which we now
turn.
1 3 1
3. Training Materials and Instruction
To learn about police attitudes regarding the function of police re-
ports and the perceived importance of investigating and reporting excul-
patory information, I reviewed report forms and training materials from
127. Quantico Class response: 8/9 (89%).
128. Quantico Class response: 7/9 (78%); all police: 14/17 (82%).
129. Quantico Class response: 2/9 (22%).
130. Quantico Class response: 0/9 (0%).
131. For another instance where police claims of compliance with legal norms
proved inconsistent with observations of other knowledgeable actors, see Orfield,
supra note 19, at 81-82 (first study, based on interviews with Chicago police, convinced
author that "police perjury at suppression hearings is a minor problem"; subsequent
study, based on interviews with Chicago prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges dis-
closed pattern of "pervasive police perjury").
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six police agencies in several states.' 32 Interviews were also conducted
with administrative or training staff from three of the departments.
Based on these modest inquiries, I conclude that police are trained to
ignore exculpatory facts, except when they clearly negate probable cause
(in which case, presumably, no arrest will occur). This lesson is not
taught explicitly; rather, it is inferred from things said and left unsaid.
Report writing is considered an important skill to which some police
academies devote substantial training time.' 33 Recruits are taught the
proper way to complete departmental incident and arrest forms. These
consist both of boxes requiring specific items of information, and a narra-
tive portion. Instruction, based on detailed training manuals and class-
room exercises, covers topics ranging from style, spelling, and grammar
to the proper description of scars and tattoos.
Training materials also instruct patrol officers to take detailed field
notes, erring on the side of recording all details, and the names and ad-
dresses of all witnesses.' 34 Field notes form the raw material for reports,
but not all facts recorded in field notes are necessarily reported. 135 Of-
ficers are taught to write "complete" and "accurate" reports of "all rele-
vant information."13 6 These instructions would seem to require the
reporting of exculpatory facts. But that conclusion is undermined by
132. These were the police departments of City One and City Two, and of Atlanta,
Chicago, and Detroit. I also reviewed the statewide Report Writing Handbook pub-
lished by the Massachusetts CriminalJustice Training Council, see infra note 136, and,
courtesy of Lt. Samuel T. Ragland, University of Arizona Police Dept., I reviewed the
Report Writing Manual co-edited by him, and published by the Arizona Law Enforce-
ment Training Academy. That manual is intended for use by all Arizona law enforce-
ment agencies. See Arizona Law Enforcement Training Academy, Report Writing
Manual (1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter Arizona Report Writing Manual].
133. In City One, recruits receive 44 hours of instruction in report writing (38
basic, 6 on use of force), plus later in-service training. In Atlanta, the basic course is
12 hours. The Arizona Basic Training program requires cadets to pass a 45 hour
course in report writing to graduate.
134. For example, Atlanta recruits are told: "Don't be afraid of making your notes
too complete.... Everything pertinent, including the state of the weather, starts out
in your notes and winds up in one form or another in your report." Atlanta Police
Dept., Preliminary Inquiry, Field Notes and Police Reports 14 (rev. Sept. 1990) (un-
published materials, on file with author) [hereinafter Atlanta Preliminary Inquiry]; see
also Arizona Report Writing Manual, supra note 132, at 7-2 (notes should be complete
and detailed).
135. See, e.g., Atlanta Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 134, at 9; City One Police
Department, Rules and Procedures Manual (on file with author) (patrol officer is
"encouraged to keep a private record of his work, noting all matters of importance in
which he is engaged in his official capacity").
136. In Massachusetts, for example, the report should be "complete: as full an ac-
count as possible." Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Counsel, Report Writing
Handbook 6 (1986); see also REPORT ON POLICE, supra note 97, at 571 (Commentary to
Standard 24.1, "Police Reporting," provides that police departments "should require
that all relevant criminal information be reported."); Atlanta Preliminary Inquiry,
supra note 134, at 14.
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other, more subtle aspects of most of the examined training materials,
namely: (1) the omission of exculpatory facts from the specific, affirma-
tive categories of what should or must be reported; (2) an emphasis on
the need for self-protection; and (3) a tone of partisanship.
In most of the training materials, exculpatory facts are excluded from
reportable information by a process of negative inference. With the ex-
ception of Atlanta,'3 7 none of the report forms examined specifically calls
for any exculpatory facts, such as the victim's intoxication or the defend-
ant's alibi. An officer could report such information in the narrative por-
tion. However, officers are generally' 3 8 instructed to write concise
narratives eliminating "irrelevant" and "unnecessary" information. But
what information is "relevant" and "necessary"? By implication, it seems,
exculpatory evidence does not qualify.'3 9
For example, the City One manual for completion of incident reports
addresses "What Goes In and What is Left Out of the Narrative?" 140 "In"
includes "whatever is necessary to get evidence into court," elements of
all the crimes alleged, the names and addresses of "everyone," and any-
thing that 'justifies some subsequent [police] action" or aids in future in-
vestigation of the crime. "Out" is other behavior which neither qualifies
as "in" nor fulfills some other specified purpose of the report.141
The failure of otherwise comprehensive and detailed training materi-
als to address the proper treatment of exculpatory facts also implies their
"irrelevance." It cannot be rare for officers to encounter, for example, a
victim whose original description of the assailant differed from that of the
arrestee whom was later identified. But the training materials I reviewed
give no explicit instruction on whether to record and report the
discrepancy.
At the same time, these materials stress the importance of proper
note-taking and report-writing to protect individual officers and the de-
partment from criticism or civil liability. For example, the Chicago Police
Department's Field Reporting Manual teaches that reports are needed to
"protect the Department and the officer handling the investigation from
unwarranted accusations that improper police action was taken or that no
service was rendered."14 2 This concern might undermine any inclination
to record or report exculpatory facts.
137. Exceptionally, the Atlanta offense report form has a box for "victim sobriety,"
requiring a check for "Sober," "Drinking," or "Drunk." City of Atlanta Department of
Police, Offense Report (unpublished material, on file with author).
138. The Arizona training materials .encourage a more detailed report. See infra
note 143.
139. See Palmer, infta at text accompanying notes 189-90 (what is "pertinent" infor-
mation varies from one detective to another).
140. City One Introduction to Incident Reporting, supra note 26.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
142. Chicago Police Department, Chicago Police Department Field Reporting
Manual-General Reporting Instructions, I I(C) (6) (rev. Dec. 1985) (unpublished
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Other protective concerns are reflected in training materials that
teach the use of paraphrases or approximations instead of the exact
words used by a witness. 143 For example, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment's training materials direct officers to "[r] ecord all descriptions con-
cerning possible offenders as approximations," and to "[r]ecord
information learned from witnesses as 'in summary it was determined
from Mr. . . .' or 'the facts in essence are .... ' ,144 Similarly, the City One
Police Department instructs officers to record the time of the offense,
distances, and a non-arrested suspect's age, height, or weight in approxi-
mate ranges rather than in exact figures.145 A suspect's weight, for exam-
ple, should be estimated in ten pound increments, e.g., 140-150 lbs.
Several justifications are offered for these practices. One is the belief
that the witness's own words, spoken under stress, will likely be unclear
and, as to some matters, can only be approximations. By not recording
them, the officer deprives defense attorneys of an "unfair" opportunity to
conduct possibly damaging cross examination. 146 Another justification
for withholding details from the report is to avoid the risk that media
publicity will threaten the integrity of ongoing investigations and victim
training materials of the Chicago Police Department, on file with author) [hereinafter
Chicago Field Reporting Manual]; see also DONALD 0. ScHULTz, THE PoLic As THE
DEFENDANT 21 (1984) (advising writing reports in "great detail" if it appears that a
[civil] lawsuit might arise from the situation).
143. An extreme version of this practice is found in City One, where patrol officers
who initially respond to sexual assaults are forbidden to investigate or report specifics
of the sexual assault; details volunteered by the victim must be omitted from the inci-
dent report. City One Police Academy, Training Bulletin (unpublished material, on
file with author). The given rationale for prohibiting detailed questioning of the vic-
tim is that patrol officers lack the special skills needed to minimize further traumatiza-
tion of the victim. The rationale for prohibiting the reporting of volunteered
statements is unclear. State law governing City One protects the confidentiality of
police reports of sexual assaults.
In contrast to the other training materials I reviewed, the Arizona materials stress
the importance of writing specific, detailed reports. These materials also approve the
practice of taking detailed statements from witnesses, and to note (but not necessarily
in the report) whether the witness statement "conflicts with or substantiates other
statements made by the victim, the suspects, or other witnesses." Arizona Report Writ-
ing Manual, supra note 132, at 8-8 & apps.
144. Chicago Field Reporting Manual, supra note 142, 1 VI(C) (2)-(3); see also City
One Introduction to Incident Reporting, supra note 26, at 20 ('Yourjob is to listen
carefully and assist the victim in recalling the details of the event. When you believe
you have gathered all pertinent information, repeat what you have learned to the victim in
your own words. This is called 'paraphrasing.' If you and the victim are in agreement,
you are ready to begin your report.") (emphasis added).
145. City One Introduction to Incident Reporting, supra note 26, at 6, 12.
146. Interview with anonymous instructor, City One Police Academy, in City One
Police Academy (July 2, 1991) [hereinafter Interview with City One instructor]. "The
police don't want a defense attorney to be able to argue, 'You said he was 5'9" and the
defendant is 5'11.'" Id. See infra text acompanying notes 289-90.
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privacy.147 Even if one were persuaded by these concerns, in effect the
practice substitutes a police description of events for the witness's own,
and risks the loss of exculpatory details.
Finally, none of the training materials addresses the importance of
investigating, recording, or reporting exculpatory facts to avoid punish-
ment of a possibly innocent arrestee. On the contrary, the materials re-
flect a psychological set in which the arrestee's guilt is presumed, and the
only use of notes and reports in the criminal process is to ensure convic-
tion.1 48 In this view, there is no thought that accurate notes might clear
an innocent suspect, and the only value of defendant's exculpatory state-
ments lies in their falsehood.' 4 9 Correspondingly, potential defense uses
of deficient reports are presented as tactics to free a guilty person.150 For
example, the Atlanta materials discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of using a loose-leaf versus spiral bound field notebook:
The loose-leaf notebook allows the officer to take only those notes rele-
vant to a case into court, but the defense attorney can claim that the
notes are incomplete or imply that the officer removed or lost some
pages. The bound kind reduces the claim of incompleteness, but the
defense attorney can look through all your notes whether or not the
notes have anything to do with the case.15 1
By implying that police must anticipate and defend against partisan
use (perceived as misuse) of police notes and reports by the defense, this
sort of instruction encourages a "strategic" approach to report-writing as
a means to prevent embarrassment, civil liability, or loss of the prosecu-
tion's case. Indeed, researchers have found that some police believe that
detailed reports will, through defense discovery, "facilitate the impeach-
ment of prosecution witnesses, frequently policemen," and that police
should therefore communicate details orally to prosecutors.' 52 In this
connection, a report-writing instructor at City One Police Academy ex-
147. We learned of a debate within the City One Police Department between those
who support the current policy that "everything should go into the report" and those
who advocate putting only a sketch of the crime into the report. Advocates of the
latter view argue that media access to reports, which are public records in the state,
poses the key threat. Interview with City One instructor, supra note 146.
148. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF POLICE CHIEFs, TRAINING KEY No. 46, FIELD
NOTE TAxiNG 1-2 (1966) ("Evidence to establish proof of guilt is difficult enough to
obtain without further weakening a case by failing to testify accurately and effectively.
... The officer's notes can help the witness to recall what he said, or can be used to
counteract the denials of a reluctant witness or the accused.").
149. McDonald, supra note 99, at 208 (sometimes police do not transmit informa-
tion, "such as false exculpatory statements ... because it is not recognized as having
any evidentiary value.").
150. Thus, for example, a poorly written report "give [s] the defense attorney some-
thing to use to try to confuse your testimony." Arizona Report Writing Manual, supra
note 132, at 5-1.
151. Atlanta Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 134, at 11-12.
152. GREENWOOD, supra note 93, at 172 n.3; McDonald, supra note 99, at 208. I
suspect that this belief is widespread in some departments.
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plained to an interviewer that, while "of course we have to document any-
thing that is exculpatory," knowledge of the fact that defense attorneys
will read the report definitely "affects the way the report is written." 53 As
an extreme example, the City One Department changed the criteria for
answering one question on the incident report form, solely in response to
regular defense exploitation of an apparently exculpatory response. 54
D. Summary
In this Part, I have explored the reasons for inaccurate or misleading
police reports. They can be understood both by looking at the functions
that reports serve for the police, and by looking at police culture and
practices. Deliberately false and misleading reports, which probably ac-
count for only a fraction of misleading reports, are best viewed in the
wider context of police work, where lying is widely tolerated, if not ac-
cepted, as a response to various individual and institutional pressures. A
more common reason for misleading reports is probably the failure to
report exculpatory evidence: the literature, questionnaire responses, and
training materials suggest a disparity between the announced rules (re-
port "all relevarit information") and the working rules (report only incul-
patory evidence).155 The revealed pattern of superficial, one-sided
reporting, hostile to the inclusion of exculpatory evidence, is understand-
able in light of the fact that the police design reports to meet their own
needs, without particular concern for the needs of other actors in the
criminal justice system. But when the latter receive police reports uncriti-
cally, as if they were balanced and objective accounts of the facts, inno-
cent defendants suffer. As I argue in the next Part of this paper, this may
occur quite often, at various stages of the criminal process.
153. Interview with City One instructor, supra note 146. Training materials uni-
formly remind officers to "keep the audience [for reports] in mind," an audience
that expressly includes, inter alia, defense attorneys and the media. In Chicago, re-
cruits are informed at the outset of the Illinois Supreme Court Rule permitting de-
fense discovery of police notes, reports, memoranda, etc. Chicago Field Reporting
Manual, supra note 142, 1 (A) (3).
154. Previously, if a suspect's name and address were unknown, police were told to
answer "no" to the incident report question, "[c]an the suspect be identified at this
time?" This served the question's original purpose, to steer scarce investigative re-
sources to the most "solvable" crimes. Because of defense counsels' use of "no" re-
sponses to impeach witness credibility at trial, now the police are told to answer "yes"
if a witness says he can recognize the suspect. In sexual assault incident reports, pa-
trol officers are instructed to answer "yes" "regardless of how little information the
victim can recall." City One Police Academy, Training Bulletin (unpublished mate-
rial, on file with author).
155. On the distinction between "formal rules" and "working rules" in police work,
see Mike McConville, Videotaping Interrogations, 1992 CraM. L. REv. 532, 535 (police
practices are based not so much in the official rules as in police-generated "working
rules" which control "in situations where officers believe that their job 'cannot be
done by the book.'").
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III. IMPACT OF MISLEADING POLICE REPORTS ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS
Police reports can affect the criminal process because, at various
stages, the report, rather than the officer's personal knowledge of the
events reported, "come[s] to stand for the reality of what happened."156
This happens often because the patrol officers and detectives who write
the reports are unavailable when criminal justice personnel must make
decisions. Relying on the report is faster and cheaper than finding the
officer and arranging an interview. Also, the police, responding to their
own personal and organizational imperatives, sometimes ignore or balk
at interview requests by prosecutors, probation officers, and defense at-
torneys. Finally, reports become important because, especially in minor
cases, police and other witnesses might have little or no independent
memory of the events reported. As the primary record of the underlying
facts, the reports are used weeks, months, or years after the incident to
refresh their memory prior to testifying. (They also serve to corroborate
or impeach such testimony).
Jones v. City of Chicago,'57 offers a particularly egregious example of
how false police reports, and reports that omit important exculpatory
facts, can adversely affect the defendant. Reports may vitally affect official
decisions such as charge selection, whether to release the defendant
pending trial, decisions on mental health status, plea-bargaining, and
probation revocation. Police reporting practices also determine the de-
fendant's access to exculpatory evidence, whether by subpoena, routine
discovery motions, or prosecutorial initiatives under Brady.'58
CHARGE SELECTION
As in Jones, a report may influence charge selection by providing the
basis of probable cause to support particular charges. In jurisdictions
where initial charge screening relies primarily on the police report,159 a
report that exaggerates the defendant's guilt can lead to overcharging.
This, in turn, can cause a judge to set higher bail, or-by increasing the
risk of conviction at trial-coerce the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. 160 Consider the following case, where the officer's technically
156. Ericson, supra note 9, at 96.
157. 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 1 to 7.
158. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
159. In Massachusetts, for example, the initial charging document, the "com-
plaint," may be issued by a clerk-magistrate based on a police application specifying
charges selected by the latter. Typically, the application consists of an abbreviated
version of the police incident report. See Stanley Z. Fisher, Complaints and Indictments,
in 1 MASSACHu5STrS CRimiNAL DEFENSE § 4.2(A) (Eric D. Blumenson ed., 1990 &
Supp. 1992). In practice, clerk-magistrates do not screen police applications for prob-
able cause if the alleged perpetrator has been arrested. Id.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 194-99.
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accurate but misleading description led to overcharging and consequent
hardship for the defendant.
JACKSON'S CASE: THE ASSAULTED NURSE 1 6 1
Mr. Jackson, a homeless, thought-disordered client, sought treatment
one cold night for "frostbite" in the City Hospital Emergency room. Af-
ter a frustrating wait, Jackson had an argument with a nurse, which re-
sulted in his arrest. According to the police reportJackson "assault[ed]"
the nurse "by hand to face."162 He was charged with assault and battery.
Jackson was committed to a locked psychiatric facility for twenty days to
determine his mental competence and criminal responsibility. When I
interviewed him, he admitted having an argument with the nurse but
denied striking her. The arresting officer confirmed to me during a tele-
phone conversation that Jackson never hit the nurse; the report's lan-
guage, "hand to face" meant to describe only a threatening motion.
163
After six weeks of incarceration, and six court appearances over a ten
month period, we were able to get the charges dismissed.
Even in jurisdictions where prosecutors conduct pre-charge screening,
including interviewing the police officer and the victim,'6 the prosecutor
might not have the time or ability to discover the relevant facts needed to
correct misleading impressions created by a sketchy, one-sided report. 65
161. To protect confidentiality, all names of clients, victims, and police, and some
location names, have been changed.
162. The report also alleged that the defendant had been removed and escorted
off hospital property three times that night, was disorderly in the Emergency Room
and Nursing Station, and had kicked the arresting police officer; these allegations
resulted in additional charges of disorderly conduct and assault and battery (against
the officer) with a dangerous weapon (to wit, a "shod foot"). The officer in question
was notorious for charging his "disorderly" arrestees with the latter offense. I do not
believe that either of these two charges influenced the disposition ofJackson's case at
any stage. Rather, official concern focused on the alleged striking of the nurse.
163. The misleading report might have resulted from carelessness. The arresting
officer's terminology, "assault ... hand to face," was technically correct but ambigu-
ous. Why the officer applied for an assault and battery complaint, rather than one for
simple assault, is a matter of speculation; he might have acted out of ill will, but igno-
rance of the criminal law seems as likely. This officer was a hospital security guard,
not a city police officer. The harsh consequences forJackson flowed from an ineffi-
cient, almost Kafkaesque screening process: pro forma issuance of the complaint by a
clerk, the officer's failure to appear in court on any of the scheduled dates, and the
complete absence of communication between the officer and the rotating prosecutors
who handled the file. In a system struggling to stay afloat in a massive tide of cases,
.minor' cases like Jackson's do not get much attention.
164. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(f)
(1984 & Supp. 1991).
165. See e.g., DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGHJusTiCE 27-30 (1990); WEINREB, supra note
21, at 57-59 (on the sole basis of police report, prosecutor brings the most serious
plausible accusation); GREENwooD, supra note 93, at ch. 11, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 268-72 (in study of two California jurisdictions, the one with less
detailed police reports experienced more dismissals and charge reductions).
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BAIL
Prosecutors and judges may rely heavily upon police reports in bail
decisions. If, as was true in Jones, the report exaggerates the evidence of
guilt, unjustifiably high bail may be set.166 In the court where I served as
a public defender, typically neither the arresting officer nor the victim
was present at the arraignment, and the police report thus became the
exclusive source of factual information to support the defendant's arrest.
In Jackson's case, 16 7 for example, neither the officer nor the victim ever
appeared in court, but no official was willing to agree to the defendant's
release until the misleading nature of the police report was firmly
established. 168
MENTAL EVALUATIONS
Police reports-and the charges based on those reports-may also in-
fluence mental health professionals conducting court-ordered examina-
tions to assess the defendant's criminal responsibility or dangerousness.
The judge in Jackson's case, discussed above, 169 influenced by the mis-
leading police report and the inflated charge of assault and battery on a
nurse, committed Jackson for twenty days to an inpatient facility for ex-
amination of his competency and criminal responsibility. Based partially
on the same incorrect belief that Jackson had slapped the triage nurse,
the examining psychologist concluded that Jackson was dangerous and
required a further commitment for thirty days to determine whether it
would then be safe to release him to the community. 170 The second hos-
166. SeeJones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 1-7. In Jones, the prosecutor used a police report that was
"full of falsehoods" and that omitted important exculpatory information, to obtain a
$250,000 bond for the teenaged murder suspect, who was brutalized in jail for a
month before the bond was reduced.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
168. At Mr.Jackson's arraignment, for example, the judge replied to defense coun-
sel's plea forJackson's release on personal recognizance with the comment, "I don't
release people who slap nurses." Most of Jackson's pretrial detention occurred in
hospital settings, under statutes permitting court-ordered commitment for psychiatric
examination.
Another client, Mr. Bowman, see supra note 107, only narrowly escaped detention
because of the one-sided report. When arrested, he was on probation for an in-
trafamily assault and battery conviction. The prosecutor recommended substantial
cash bail, which would normally be imposed for an armed robbery with injury to the
victim and a "prompt identification." Fortunately, we were able to get Bowman's pro-
bation officer to help persuade the judge to release him on personal recognizance.
Had Bowman been before a less open-mindedjudge, if his probation officer had been
unavailable, or if his relationship with her had been less satisfactory, he might well
have been jailed during at least part of the three weeks it took to get the charges
dismissed.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
170. I learned this from the examining psychologist when I informed him of the
actual criminal allegations after he had completed his report. However, his report
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pital report concluded thatJackson could safely be released to the com-
munity for outpatient treatment, and he was. One cannot know
whether-given a more accurate police report-the defendant might
have avoided all or part of the six weeks he spent in locked psychiatric
wards.
EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS: GRAND JuRius, PRELIMINARY HEARINGS,
AND TRL
Because grand jury indictments usually may rest on hearsay testi-
mony,171 a misleading police report could influence a grandjury to indict
when it otherwise would not. This might occur, for example, if a police
witness without direct knowledge of the facts testifies on the basis of the
report, unaware of important exculpatory facts omitted from it.172 At a
preliminary hearing or trial, on the other hand, a police report, if offered
by the government, might be inadmissible as hearsay. 173 But the report
can be used to impeach a testifying officer's credibility.174 This possibility
discourages the police from testifying inconsistently with statements in-
cluded in the report. By the same token, a report's silence as to exculpa-
tory information frees police witnesses to "forget" or deny the
information's existence. Thus, in Jones v. City of Chicago,175 the suppres-
sion of Detective Laverty's and other reports describing Purvy's shaky
also cited two incidents in the hospital in which staff reported thatJackson had acted
violently. One of the incidents, in which Jackson allegedly "jammed (a] fork in [a
silverware] basket in a manner that was seen as an attempt to injure staff," probably
also influenced the report's conclusions, and clearly influenced the court to commit
Jackson for further examination. The psychologist also concluded that Jackson was
incompetent to stand trial and was not eriminally responsible for his alleged criminal
conduct.
171. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CIuMINAL PRocEDuRE § 15.4(a)-(d)
(1984 & Supp. 1991).
172. In most jurisdictions the government has no duty to reveal the existence of
exculpatory evidence to the grandjury. LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 171, § 15.4(d);
United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (federal courts lack inherent "super-
visory power" to require prosecutors to reveal the existence of substantial exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury).
173. A police report might be inadmissible, at least if its maker does not testify, as
offensive to the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. This concern un-
derlies the exclusion in criminal cases, under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (B), of
"matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel" from ad-
mission as public records, see FED. R. EvD. 803(8) advisory committee's notes, 56
F.RD. 312, 313, or under other hearsay exceptions, see United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 63-77 (2d Cir. 1977), except, perhaps, if the reports concern only "routine
nonadversarial observations." See United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533 (9th
Cir. 1980); 2 CHARLEs T. McCoRMiCK, McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 296 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
174. A retired Boston police officer boasted to my colleague David Rossman that
he used to bring his field notes to the witness stand, hidden inside his hat. To guard
against impeachment by a sharp-eyed defense attorney, he wrote his notes in Gaelic.
175. 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
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identifications ofJones enabled Purvy to make a "positive identification"
of defendant at trial. The suppression of these reports also allowed an
assistant state's attorney, who had witnessed Purvy's "yes, no, yes, no"
identification, to testify that Purvy's identification of George Jones "was
the best identification he had ever seen."x76 Unless every such defendant
has a Detective Laverty waiting in the wings, tragic injustice can result.
DEFENSE INVESTIGATION AND STRATEGY
Defense attorneys also may be dependent upon police reports in sev-
eral ways. Because police investigate the case first, and often have the
sole opportunity to gather and record crucial facts, defense counsel may
have no comparable source to learn what happened. This is true espe-
cially for lawyers representing indigent clients, who frequently lack
prompt or easy access to independent investigative services.' 77 If discov-
erable at an early stage, the police report also gives defense counsel in-
sight into the strength of the government's case, and facilitates (or, by
silence, obstructs) prompt defense investigation of the case. The report
can also influence important defense decisions such as whether to seek
early disposition of the case by plea negotiation, or to bring certain pre-
trial motions.
DISCOVERY:. THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "DOUBLE FILE" SYSTEM
By controlling what information goes into reports and what stays out,
the police are able to control access to exculpatory evidence by both pros-
ecutors' 78 and defense attorneys.' 79 The Chicago Police Department's
reporting practices, as revealed in Jones and in Palmer,'80 illustrate this.
The practices also reflect the general pattern described earlier:181 cus-
tomary disregard of exculpatory facts in the face of formal policies requir-
ing "complete and accurate" reporting.
176. Id. at 990.
177. SeeJohn M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The
Constitutional Mandate ofAke v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326 (1986); Toward a
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation, supra note 23, at 836, 852-53. For
a similar observation about the defense plight in England, see Patrick O'Connor, Pros-
ecution Disclosure, 1992 CRIM. L. Rxv. 464.
178. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988) (police
may have "systematically concealed" exculpatory information from prosecutors);
Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 560
(7th Cir. 1985) (Chicago prosecutors may have been unaware of the city-wide exist-
ence of street files).
179. New York City prosecutors only recently discovered a Police Department prac-
tice of generating intra-departmental "unofficial" "confidential" reports that were not
disclosed to prosecutors. See People v. Young, 591 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 & n.* (N.Y.
1992).
180. Palmer, 562 F. Supp. at 1072.
181. See supra Parts II(C) (2)-(3).
[Vol. 28:1
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The police in Jones had gathered substantial exculpatory evidence.
They had also recorded this information in notes and memoranda. Yet,
these documents were not produced in response to several defense sub-
poenas for Chicago Police Department (CPD) records, including one re-
questing "[a n y and all police reports, arrest reports, .. . supplementary
reports, witness statements .... or written memorandum of any kind"
concerning the crime.' 8 2 Nor were they produced in response to discov-
ery motions requesting exculpatory information under Brady. The reason
for nonproduction, learned only as a result of Detective Laverty's disclo-
sures, lay in the CPD's "double file" system. Laverty's reports, and other
exculpatory documents like the one describing Purvy's "Anderson" inter-
view, were placed:
not in the police department's regular files but in its 'street files.' These
were files that the police did not turn over to the state's attorney's office
as they did with their regular investigative files. As a result, the street files
were not available to defense counsel even if they contained exculpatory
material.183
Before Laverty's revelations, the Chicago criminal defense bar had
been unaware of the need to draft subpoenas and discovery requests
broadly enough to encompass documents not contained in regular police
files.' 8 4 Nor had the State's Attorney's Office, in response to discovery
motions, tried to learn whether any investigative documents existed
outside the regular files.' 8 5
Upon learning of the practice from Jones's trial, attorneys brought a
class action in federal court (Palmer) to discover exculpatory information
in "street files" for already-convicted plaintiffs and for those awaiting
trial.186 In district court hearings, details of the CPD double file system
emerged. Detectives investigating violent crimes recorded the results of
their investigations in both "unofficial reports" (such as detectives' notes,
witness statements, incident worksheets, and intra-departmental memo-
randa), and "official reports" (such as standardized incident reports).
Only the latter were transmitted to the CPD Records Division, and given
file numbers, and only they were produced in response to subpoena re-
quests for "'any and all' documents." Unofficial Reports ("street files")
were kept at the Areas's detective facilities.
Although the existence of Unofficial Reports was well known within
the Department, the CPD "took no official cognizance of and had no
official policy" concerning them, and established "no uniform practice
182. Palmer, 755 F.2d at 562.
183. Jones, 856 F.2d at 989.
184. Palmer, 562 F. Supp. at 1071.
185. Id. at 1072.
186. See id. at 1068-72.
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... as to [their] preparation, retention, use or storage .."187 The De-
partment's policy was:
that all official reports prepared in the course of a violent felony investi-
gation must be complete and accurate; that is, such reports must contain
all information known to the preparer(s) which pertains to the offense or
to the person(s) accused thereof.'8 8
However, it was conceded, "[w] hat's pertinent to one [detective] might
not be to another." 8 9 In practice:
Official Reports have sometimes been prepared from the perspective of
what fits the preparer's concept of the crime, so they omit information
that-though highly relevant and sometimes exculpatory of the defend-
ant charged with the offense-the preparer does not deem
"pertinent." 190
Although the federal district court ordered the CPD to cease using
double files, its order was reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.19 1 Whether the double file system persists in Chicago to this day is
unclear.19 2
PLEA BARGAINING AND SENTENCING
Because many more convictions result from guilty pleas than from tri-
als, the greatest impact of inaccurate or incomplete police reports is on
the plea-negotiation process. In theory, the defense attorney has the duty
to conduct a thorough, independent factual investigation before advising
the defendant whether to plead guilty or go to trial.' 9 3 In practice, how-
ever, many defendants plead guilty without any meaningful defense inves-
tigation.' 9 4 Also, because the police do not generally conduct a follow-up
investigation after a case has been "cleared" by arrest, 95 the initial police
187. Id. at 1070.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1070 n.3.
190. Id. at 1070.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 212-14.
192. CompareJones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 1988) ("the prac-
tice was discontinued following [the] class-action suit") with Orfield, supra note 19, at
102 ("virtually impossible to know" whether dual file system still exists).
193. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (defense counsel has a
duty to conduct reasonable investigation); ABA STANDARDS FOR CIUMINNAJusIcE, Std.
4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986).
194. A study of indigent representation in NewYork City shows that this is blatantly
true for defendants represented by appbinted private attorneys, who lack free access
to investigative services, but less true for public defenders, who do have such access.
Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City,
15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 761-66, 770-74 (1987). See also MALcOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 10 (1979); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining 84YALE LJ. 1179 (1975); StephenJ. Schulhofer, Effec-
tiveAssistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REv L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 140-44 (1986)
(reasons for pleas without investigation).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
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report may be the principal "objective" source of facts influencing the
prosecutor in plea negotiations' 96 and providing the factual basis re-
quired for a valid guilty plea.'9 7 To the extent that a report misstates or
exaggerates the evidence inculpating the defendant, it can coerce him to
plead guilty to a crime he did not commit.19 8 Furthermore, a police re-
port can exert influence long after the case ends, when an offender's
record becomes relevant for purposes of sentencing for new offenses. In
this way, a report that exaggerates the offender's culpability might result
in increased punishment years later.199
196. "[I]n the typical case, both the prosecution and the defense must form an
impression of the facts from a cold [prosecutor's] file, a sketchy (and sometimes illegi-
ble) police report, and a hurried confeirence with the complainant or the accused."
Schulhofer, supra note 194, at 144. See also FEELE', supra note 194, at 179-80; WEnrvEB,
supra note 21, at 48-49, 68-69.
197. In Massachusetts, for example, the report is typically read aloud to form the
"factual basis" for the plea, as required by MAss. R. CrM. P. 12(c) (5) (A). See also FED.
R. GRM. P. 11(f). A report that exaggerates the defendant's guilt might also influ-
ence a judge to reject an appropriate plea bargain as excessively lenient.
198. For the proposition that more than a few innocent defendants plead guilty,
see C. Ronald Huff & Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: False Positives and the Crimi-
nal Justice Process, in CoNTRovERsIL. IssuEs IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 130, 140 (Joseph E.
Scott & Travis Hirschi eds., 1988); Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a
Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 717, 732-34 (1992); Kevin
C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957,
984-94 (1989). But see Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and
Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEG. STUDIES 395, 415-16 (1987) (arguing that "few [innocent]
defendants who are misidentified plead guilty to serious felony charges"). Professor
Gross based his conclusion on a study of 136 proven cases of eyewitness misidentifica-
tions by strangers, of which 97 cases resulted in conviction, but only two of the convic-
tions resulted from a guilty plea. Id. at 412-15. Gross's argument does not apply to
the myriad street crimes that are not serious felonies, nor to crimes not involving
misidentification. But even for the cases he studied, Gross's data do not dispel the
concern that innocent defendants succumb to the coercive pressures of plea-bargain-
ing. Over half of his cases occurred between 1900-1960. Id. at 413. At least in the
earlier part of that period, reliance on plea-bargaining was less extensive than now.
See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process,
JUSTIcE SYSTEM J. 338 (1982); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American
Criminal Trial 67 NoTRE DAME L. Ry. -403, 466-68 (1992). Also, in most cases the
suspects were exonerated as a result of deliberate investigation, conducted either by
representatives of the defendant (attorney, investigator, family) or by the authorities
acting in response to such persons. Gross, supra, at 422. Many defendants, including
those most vulnerable to a coerced plea of guilty, lack the resources necessary to mo-
bilize such an investigation.
199. The facts underlying a conviction for "assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon" might be more culpable (an unprovoked beating of a stranger, resulting in
serious injury) or less so (provoked fight with a neighbor, not resulting in serious
injury). An objective, detailed report provides a firmer basis for future culpability
judgments than a one-sided, cursory report.
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PROBATION REVOCATION
Police reports can also affect decisions to revoke probation and pa-
role. Because ajudge may revoke probation and order the defendant to
jail based on a new arrest,20 0 issuance of a probation surrender notice
"raises the ante" for a defendant both immediately (e.g., as a potentially
negative influence on the bail decision) and in the long-term (e.g., by
strengthening the prosecutor's hand in plea bargaining, or by actually
leading to revocation).
SUMMARY
Police reports that exaggerate guilt or omit important exculpatory
facts can harm the defendant at various stages of the criminal process. If
the accuracy and reliability of police reports could be improved, or, if
decision makers were alert to the common deficiencies in police reports,
this might result in fairer treatment of defendants as well as more effi-
cient use of scarce judicial resources.
We will next consider judicial and administrative remedies for the
problem of deceptive and one-sided police reporting.
IV. REMEDIES FOR THE FAILURE TO REPORT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
In this Part I discuss the actions that courts, prosecutors, and police
administrators can take to induce the police to expand their reporting of
exculpatory evidence. The goal, I suggest, should be to require the re-
porting of several objectively-defined categories of exculpatory, or poten-
tially exculpatory, information. How to induce or compel this reform is
problematic. Serious doctrinal and institutional obstacles to judicial re-
lief exist, especially in the federal courts, and neither the police nor pros-
ecution agencies are likely to want this change. I conclude, however, that
defense lawyers might succeed in persuading state courts to order sys-
temic relief, and that more can be done to induce prosecutors to locate
and review exculpatory evidence known to the police.
A. Judicial Remedies: Jones and Palmer
A variety ofjudicial remedies might be sought for harm to defendants
resulting from deceptive police reports, and from police failure to report
exculpatory evidence. They include civil actions for damages and injunc-
200. In Massachusetts, for example, the defendant might receive a notice of sur-
render at the arraignment on the new charges. Although it is not usual to revoke
probation before final disposition of the new charge, courts in Massachusetts and
elsewhere sometimes do so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193
(Mass. 1990) (upholding probation revocation based solely on police arrest reports
read aloud by a probation officer who had no personal knowledge of the facts re-




tive relief, and motions for discovery, dismissal of charges,20 1 or post-con-
viction relief in criminal cases. The Jones and Palmer cases, discussed
above,2 0 2 provide an occasion for considering all of these remedies. They
also illustrate the severe limits upon effective judicial remedies.
1. Tort Remedies
George Jones sued individual police officers and the City of Chicago
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and
other wrongs. In an opinion by Judge Richard Posner describingJones's
treatment as "a frightening abuse of power by members of the Chicago
police force," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an $801,000
damage award.20 3
Jones won his civil rights suit against the individual officers because he
was able to prove that they culpably caused the injuries that resulted from
his wrongful arrest and prosecution. 20 4 However, recovery in tort would
not be available in many other cases of arrest and prosecution based on
police reports that omit important exculpatory facts. For example, no
claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution would lie if the exculpatory
evidence were significant, but not so overwhelming that it clearly negated
probable cause. 20 5 Also, in addition to the usual difficulties of recovering
against police officers, daunting proof problems would exist if the police
had learned of exculpatory evidence but not recorded it, had recorded it
but not preserved it, or had recorded and preserved it but not made
known its existence. Regarding the last possibility, the district court in
Palmer noted that in Chicago "the exclusion of potentially exculpatory
information from Official Reports was not a random or infrequent occur-
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991) (charge
dismissed where police lost or destroyed potentially exculpatory notes of robbery vic-
tim's description of her assailant).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7, 178-90. Jones and Palmer are discussed
in Orfield, supra note 19, at 101-02.
203. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 988 (7th Cir. 1988).
204. Thejury found that no reasonable officer could have believed there was prob-
able cause to arrestJones. Id. at 994; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)
(establishing officer's qualified immunity from liability for unlawful arrest "if officers
of reasonable competence could disagree" on the existence of probable cause). Jones
also recovered against the City of Chicago on proof that the Department's custom of
maintaining clandestine street files, unavailable to the prosecutor and defense coun-
sel, denied him due process of law under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He
also sued in tort under Illinois common law. Jones, 856 F.2d at 988.
205. Absence of probable cause is an element of both unlawful arrest and mali-
cious prosecution under common law and the Federal Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988). See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 34, § 2.3(a)-(b); see also cases col-
lected in Fleming, supra note 11, at 1031-62. Civil rights claims for deprivation of due
process under Brady resulting from police suppression of exculpatory evidence would
have to satisfy the strict standards established by United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 215-23.
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rence."20 6 Sadly, the most unusual aspect of George Jones's case might
have been, not the egregious suppression of exculpatory facts, but the
persistence and courage of Detective Laverty.20 7 The plaintiffs in Palmer
sought equitable relief to free past and future criminal defendants from
dependence on rare individuals like Laverty for access to exculpatory evi-
dence. Both their success in the district court, and their cooler reception
in the Seventh Circuit, are instructive.
2. Requiring the State to Record, Preserve and Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence: The Limits of Equitable Relief
Palmer was a class action suit against the City of Chicago and Cook
County, Illinois on behalf of two plaintiff sub-classes: persons who had
been convicted and sentenced for felonies, and charged felons awaiting
trial. Plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaration that the CPD's double file system
deprived them of due process by evading the requirements of Brady and
state discovery rules; (2) an order prohibiting the double file system and
requiring the maintenance of single files subject to "proper discovery and
production"; (3) an order preserving existing street files for future pro-
duction in state court post-conviction actions; and (4) damages.208
The district court promptly granted plaintiffs' request for a temporary
restraining order requiring the CPD to preserve intact all existing street
files and their contents.20 9 After evidentiary hearings, the district court
issued a sweeping preliminary injunction that not only required the po-
lice to maintain unfiled files, but also, in effect, to act as truly neutral
investigators. Under the court's regime, detectives investigating violent
crimes were required to: (1) "conduct ... investigations in an impartial
and objective manner" and "take . . . complete notes of all relevant mat-
ters" including "not only... information and materials indicating the
possible guilt of the accused•., but also.., any information and materi-
als that may tend to show his possible innocence or aid in his defense
.. "; (2) preserve all handwritten and other notes and investigative docu-
206. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (N.D. 111. 1983), rev'd, 755
F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985).
207. Detective Laverty's rewards took the form of departmental disciplinary
charges "for having failed to advise the state's attorney that he planned to testify for
the defense in George Jones's criminal trial should that become necessary"; transfer
out of the detective division; ostracism by his fellow officers; and assignment "to a
series of menial tasks culminating in the monitoring of police recruits giving urine
samples."Jones, 856 F.2d at 991. None of the defendants in Jones were disciplined for
misconduct. Id. at 991-92.
208. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 1985).
209. Resisting the order, some detectives considered case notes and memos as
their "personal property" and, therefore, exempt from preservation orders. Two Area
Commanders testified in support of this interpretation. Palmer, 562 F. Supp. at 1072.
The temporary restraining order was then amended to require preservation of "all...




ments in a single file, together with a checklist showing the file's contents;
and (3) respond to subpoenas or discovery motions by transmitting cop-
ies of the checklist to the prosecutor.210 Prosecutors were required to
provide defendants, on request, with a copy of the checklist, copies of
discoverable police writings, and notice of documents that the prosecutor
considered were not discoverable. Prosecutors were also required to "as-
sure that no police writings have been withheld" from them.21' Finally,
the City of Chicago was required to train detectives in the new
procedures.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld only one part
of the district court's preliminary injunction: the order preserving the
existing street files of the first sub-class, convicted felons. As to the other
sub-class, criminal defendants awaiting trial, the court abstained, finding
even this modest relief an improper interference with ongoing state court
criminal proceedings under Younger v. Harris.212 Those defendants in this
sub-class were left to seek relief in the state criminal courts. As for the
other remedial measures ordered by the district court, the Court of Ap-
peals both rejected their propriety at this particular stage of the proceed-
ings,213 and expressed substantive reservations about such broad judicial
intervention into the processes of gathering, recording, and disclosing
exculpatory evidence. Noting that the injunction required the CPD and
the Cook County prosecutor's office to "restructure their internal proce-
dures for the recording, maintaining and production of investigative
files," the Circuit Court emphasized the limits imposed by Supreme Court
precedents defining the duty of police to preserve, and of prosecutors to
disclose, exculpatory evidence. 214 The relevant federal constitutional du-
ties derive mainly from two lines of cases under the due process clause:
Brady-Agurs-Bagley (duty to disclose) 2 15 and Trombetta-Youngblood (duty to
210. Palmer, 755 F.2d at 568.
211. Id. at 568-69; see also Palmer, 562 F. Supp. at 1075.
212. Palmer, 755 F.2d at 573-76 (relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Judge Cudahy dissented from key parts of the panel's decision. See Palmer, 755 F.2d at
579-82 (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
213. DissentingJudge Cudahy conceded this point. Palmer, 755 F.2d at 579 & n,1
(Cudahy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
214. Id. at 576-77. The Circuit Court's invalidation of these portions of the injunc-
tion rested on two narrow grounds: (1) the sub-class of convicted felons lacked
standing; and (2) comity concerns barred relief to criminal defendants in pending
trials. Id. at 576.
215. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). For the prosecutor's profes-
sional responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence, which is defined more broadly
than the constitutional standard, see MODEL RuL.s OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT 3.8(d)
(1990); MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssiONAL RESPONSIBILrlY DR 7-103(B) (1983); A.B.A.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJusTcE Std. 3-3.11(a) (1980 & Supp. 1986). Disciplinary
sanctions for violating Brady are rarely sought or imposed on prosecutors. SeeRichard
A. Rosen, Disciplinay Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REv. 693, 697 (1987).
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preserve).21 6 Violation of a defendant's rights under either Brady or
Trombetta will, in certain circumstances, lead to dismissal, void a convic-
tion, and/or give rise to civil liability. However, the United States
Supreme Court construes both doctrines too narrowly to support the
broad relief ordered in Palmer. Nor has the Supreme Court endorsed
other constitutional theories which might potentially support such
relief 217
The prosecutor's duty under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory
evidence extends to evidence in the hands of police. 218 Because, as a
practical matter, the prosecutor cannot disclose what the police do not
report, her duty might seem logically to require a corollary police duty to
record, preserve, and report.21 9 But the Supreme Court has not followed
this logic. Both Trombetta and Youngblood involved the duty to preserve
physical evidence already "collected" by the police. Neither case has
been construed to support a constitutional right to have the police record
intangible exculpatory evidence in the first place, as ordered by the dis-
trict court in Palmer.2 20 This severely limits the usefulness of these prece-
dents as leverage for compelling the police to broaden the scope of their
investigations and reports.
Also, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stressed in Palmer, the
defendant is entitled under Brady to receive only evidence that is "mate-
rial." 221 The Supreme Court has defined "materiality" only for purposes
of deciding whether a conviction should be reversed. In that context,
216. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. 51 (1988).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
218. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 810 (1972) (MarshallJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
State v. Gammill, 585 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Kan. CL App. 1978). This is true even if the
prosecutor is unaware of its existence despite a good faith effort. Barbee v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964). But see Bostic, Comment,
supra note 88 (Brady's application to exculpatory evidence in hands of police but un-
known to prosecutor is unclear).
219. Logic might further suggest a police duty to make reasonable efforts to gather
exculpatory evidence that is readily available-such as the names of witnesses present
at the scene-and which, if not then obtained, might be lost forever. This reasoning
underlies the district court's injunction in Palmer, requiring the police to perform all
of these tasks. See generally Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investiga-
tion, supra note 23.
220. The duty to disclose and preserve exculpatory evidence is limited to evidence
that the Government has already "gathered and taken possession of .... " United
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Colon v. Kuhlmann, No.
87-C2980, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5890, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 865 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988); State v. Pemental, 434 A.2d 932, 936 (RI. 1981).
However, a bad faith failure to collect potentially exculpatory evidence might violate
due process. See, e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989).
221. The Palmer Court, writing before Bagley was decided, applied the Agurs stan-
dard, limiting the prosecution's disclosure duty to evidence that "would create 'a rea-
sonable doubt [about the defendants' guilt] that did not otherwise exist .... '" Palmer
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evidence is "material" if "there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different,"2 22 i.e., the defendant would not have been
convicted. Considering the stage at which police must usually decide
what evidence to seek and record, this retrospective definition is not espe-
cially useful either to guide or judge their conduct.223
Finally, the state's duty to preserve exculpatory evidence under Califor-
nia v. Trombetta224 and Arizona v. Youngblood225 applies only to "material"
evidence, i.e., "evidence that might be expected to play a significant role
in the suspect's defense."226 Accordingly, its exculpatory nature must
have been apparent to the police at the time they lost or destroyed it, and
the evidence must also be such that "the defendant would be unable to
obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."227
While the meaning of "comparable evidence" is unclear, this require-
ment might restrict the disclosure duty to unique physical evidence that
would completely exonerate the defendant (such as fingerprints or blood
stains), but not evidence (such as witness statements) valuable "merely"
to impeach or corroborate other testimony.228 If so, the duty to preserve
would not reach crucial exculpatory evidence, such as the street files in
Jones, that might make the difference between conviction and acquittal.
To establish a due process violation under Trombetta and Youngblood
the defendant must do more than satisfy the requirements of materiality
and "incomparability." The defendant must also prove that the police
acted in "bad faith." This requires proof that the police knew that the
evidence was exculpatory22 9 and, it seems, that they displayed "official
animus... or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence."230
Whatever this means exactly, it will undoubtedly be very difficult to
prove.231
v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 574 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).
222. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
223. The test would require the police to speculate about such matters, for exam-
ple, as whether the defendant would give a full confession, or whether the defense
would find the exculpatory evidence without police assistance. See United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
224. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
225. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
226. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.
227. Id. at 489.
228. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*.
230. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.
231. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66-67 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (ambiguity of "bad
faith" test). Bad faith is unlikely to be found if the normal police practice is not to
record exculpatory evidence. See Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961)
(no due process denial in agents' destruction of field notes "in good faith and in
accord with their normal practices").
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Applying the foregoing federal constitutional doctrines, and re-
strained by comity concerns, the Seventh Circuit Court in Palmer took a
hands-off approach to the underlying police processes that control the
prosecutor's ability to comply with Brady. Except for ordering the police
to preserve street files of convicted defendants, 232 the court rejected any
constitutional right to measures to ensure that potentially "material" ex-
culpatory evidence will reach the prosecutor. Given the current antipa-
thy to judicial activism in the federal courts, this response was not
surprising. However, state courts might respond to due process argu-
ments more favorably. For example, some have refused to adopt the
Supreme Court's narrow test of materiality in Bagley233 or its "bad faith"
requirement in Youngblood.2 34 They might also prove more receptive to
arguments based upon Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, confronta-
tion, and compulsory process.2 35
Alternatively, a court might be persuaded to order broad prophylactic
measures to enforce defendants' non-constitutional rights. Both federal
and state courts may impose sanctions against the prosecution for failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of discovery rules.236 Sanc-
tions are often imposed for nondisclosure of prior written or recorded 237
statements of government witnesses discoverable under Jencks-type re-
quirements, even if the statements were lost or destroyed.2 38 In effect,
this creates a duty to preserve the evidence. In New York, for example:
232. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 579 (7th Cir. 1985).
233. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 589 N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1992); People v.
Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990); Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 502 N.E.2d 516
(Mass. 1987).
234. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Mass. 1991) (cit-
ing high court cases in Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, and New Hampshire). Absent bad
faith, the Massachusetts due process test requires the court to "balance the degree of
culpability of the government, the materiality of the evidence, and the potential prej-
udice to the defendant. .. ." Id. at 496.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
236. See, e.g., People v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163, 168-69 (Colo. 1990) (sanction
of witness preclusion too severe for prosecutor's non-willful failure to disclose im-
peachment material regarding crucial eyewitness). In the federal system, the duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence under FED. P. CRrm. P. 16 applies to the government as
a whole, including its investigative agencies. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,
650 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But, except for mandated disclosure of exculpatory evidence
and Jencks materials, police investigation notes and reports are protected from dis-
covery as the government's work product. See FED. P. Cm. P. 16(a) (2); Cooks v.
State, 276 So. 2d 634 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973); Steven W. Feldman, The Work Product
Rule in Criminal Practice and Procedure, 50 U. CiN. L. REv. 495, 524-28 (1981). The
same is true of some states. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 171, § 19.3(h).
237. Typically the statements are recorded in undercover tape recordings, tapes of
911 calls, and field notes or reports. See, e.g., People v. Kent, 509 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (tapes of telephone calls made to an emergency telephone 911
operator subject to mandatory disclosure to defense).
238. An illustrative case under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (West 1988), is
Slye v. United States, 602 A.2d 135 (App. D.C. 1992) (Jencks Act violated by failure to
[Vol. 28:1
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Just as the People have a duty to produce [witness statements] they also
have a correlative "obligation to preserve evidence until a request for dis-
closure is made."... If the People fail to exercise care to preserve it and
defendant is prejudiced by their mistake, the court must impose an ap-
propriate sanction. The determination of what is appropriate is commit-
ted to the trial court's sound discretion, and while the degree of
prosecutorial fault may be considered, the court's attention should focus
primarily on the overriding need to eliminate prejudice to the
defendant.23 9
In deciding whether to impose sanctions in such cases, courts typically
use a balancing test in which factors such as materiality, bad faith, and
prejudice are less rigidly applied than under Brady and Trombetta.2 40 Also,
whether the state has instituted "rigorous and systematic procedures
designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a
criminal investigation" might be relevant.24 1
Case-by-case remedies to enforce criminal discovery are of limited
value. They do not penalize the state for police failure to gather exculpa-
tory evidence, 242 or, at least without a showing of "bad faith,"24 3 for fail-
ure to record exculpatory evidence of which they know. Because defense
preserve recording of 911 call giving description of robber, but no abuse of trialjudge's discretion to refuse to impose sanction). Other states have similar require-
ments. See, e.g., New York's statutory "Rosario Rule," N.Y. CRAM. PRoc. LAw §§ 240.45
[1] [a], 240.70 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1992); People v. Martinez, 524 N.E.2d 134 (N.Y.
1988); People v. Ranghelle, 503 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Malinsky, 209
N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1965); People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961); New York v.
Geathers, 577 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
239. People v. Martinez, 524 N.E.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting People v. Kelly,
467 N.E.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted).
240. See, e.g., Slye v. United States, 602 A.2d 135, 139-40 (App. D.C. 1992).
241. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that
sanctions for non-disclosure of evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 and theJencks Act will be imposed in the future "unless the Government can show
that it has promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous and
systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the
course of a criminal investigation."). Although Bryant's continuing vitality in the D.C.
circuit has been questioned, see United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 403 (D.C. Cir.
1991), it was recently reaffirmed. See Slye v. United States, 602 A.2d 135, 140 (App.
D.C. 1992). But this factor tends to get lost in the multi-factor balancing test. See
State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 262-67 (Idaho 1989); Commonwealth v. Willie, 510 N.E.2d
258, 263-64 (Mass. 1987) (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. See, e.g., state cases confining to dictum the court's disapproval of failure to
gather or record potentially exculpatory evidence: Commonwealth v. Santiago, 567
N.E.2d 943, 951-52 & n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("potential for unfairness" in the
officer's "selective note taking"; "an officer should at leastjot down the general thrust
of the conversation and note any exculpatory statements, or the fact that none were
made"); Commonwealth v. Reid, 562 N.E.2d 1362, 1365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (im-
proper for police to release witnesses to drug transaction without recording their
names, but defendant had no right to jury instruction that failure to follow normal
police procedures may create reasonable doubt); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 88
(Del. 1989) ("duty to gather and to preserve", but dictum).
243. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989).
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discovery is so limited, the threat of sanctions mainly applies, under
Jencks-type rules, to the relatively few cases that go to hearing or trial, but
not to the many cases settled by plea bargaining without any evidentiary
hearing.2 44 Nevertheless, the very existence of these remedies might re-
sult in greater police efforts generally to preserve evidence.2 45
3. A Police Duty to Record Exculpatory Evidence: Scope and
Implementation
Suppose that a court246 were persuaded that traditional, case-by-case
measures to enforce discovery were ineffective to assure defendants their
right of access to exculpatory evidence. If the court were willing to order
increased police reporting, how should it define the mandate? Some
parts of the district court injunction in Palmer offer desirable models, but
others go too far. Requiring the police to preserve and give prosecutors
access to all investigatory notes, documents, and physical evidence in
their possession is an appropriate prophylactic measure: it is fairly defi-
nite and easy to implement, if not to enforce.2 47 The same cannot be
said, however, of the Palmer Court's order requiring police to gather and
record exculpatory evidence.
The district court in Palmer ordered the Chicago police to conduct
"impartial and objective" investigations and to take complete notes of "all
relevant matters," including "information... that may tend to show [the
accused's] possible innocence or aid in his defense."2 48 Putting aside the
important but distinct question of what evidence the police should be
required to gather,249 this approach is too vague to give the police ade-
quate guidance as to what evidence known to them must be recorded. If
construed broadly, it would require significant expenditures of police re-
sources, intrude upon the legitimate exercise of administrative discretion,
and threaten police interests in self-protection and crime control.
First, what do "all relevant matters" and "[all] information that may
tend to show [the accused's] possible innocence or aid in his defense"
include? Information that "may tend to show" the accused's innocence
244. See McMunigal, supra note 198, at 957-58 (prosecutor should be required to
disclose Brady material in plea bargaining, but "constitutional, ethical, and statutory
requirements for such disclosure are largely unresolved.").
245. Of courseJencks rules also have a counter-tendency to discourage the record-
ing of witness statements at all.
246. For reasons discussed infra, a court is more likely to order such measures than
either police or prosecution authorities.
247. Police could evade this mandate by falling to record potentially exculpatory
evidence in the first place, or, as in Jones, see supra text accompanying notes 178-91
and 207, by keeping such records in their personal possession, outside of "official"
files. These avoidance techniques could be mitigated by adoption of specific report-
ing requirements as discussed infra at text accompanying notes 254-56.
248. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1078 (7th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 755
F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985).
249. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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or aid in his defense potentially includes not only obviously exculpatory
matters ("Purvy said darker skin, but Jones's skin is lighter"), but also
many more subtle facts ("when requested to stop shortly after commis-
sion of the crime, suspect cooperated, and was neither sweating nor out
of breath"). The Palmerinjunction neither defines nor limits the universe
of relevant exculpatory facts. 250 If the standard of "relevance" is that ap-
plied by an adequately funded private defense investigator in an impor-
tant case, much more information would have to be recorded by patrol
officers responding to the scene of a serious crime than they will have
time to record. Resource limitations must be considered.
Second, how "complete" must police notes be? Must police record
witness accounts of relevant information verbatim, or may they restate
and record their own summary version? Verbatim accounts are more
"complete," but-whether recorded manually or electronically251
-they
require a greater expenditure of resources.
The broader the police obligation to report exculpatory evidence, the
greater the threat to police interests in resource conservation, self-protec-
tion, and crime control, and the less police discretion to allocate scarce
resources according to the perceived needs. An externally-imposed pol-
icy requiring some floor of exculpatory reporting, even if limited to seri-
ous crimes, 25 2 threatens this discretionary power. This is an added
reason for courts, bound to respect the separation of powers, to refrain
from blanket orders to the police to record exculpatory evidence. 25 3 It
also argues for administrative reforms, supplemented by judicial relief
narrowly tailored to abuses in particular cases.
A better alternative to the Palmer injunction's approach would be to
require the police to record specific categories of potentially exculpatory
evidence, such as the identities of percipient witnesses,25 4 their state of
250. Compare Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation, supra
note 23, at 861, proposing a state duty to gather "all possibly material evidence."
Under this proposal, violations would be measured by three factors: (1) the degree of
bad faith or negligence on the part of the police; (2) whether the police should rea-
sonably have known that the evidence was material (i.e., "whether it should have been
apparent at the time the evidence was lost that, had it been introduced at trial, there
would have been any reasonable likelihood that it might have affected the [verdict]"
Id. at 867); and (3) the ability or inability of the defendant to have gathered the
evidence while it was available. Id. at 863-68. This test does not meaningfully narrow
the field.
251. See infra text accompanying note 257.
252. The Palmer suit covered only violent felony cases. See Palmer, 562 F. Supp. at
1069.
253. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 578 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (advising judicial deference to administrators)).
254. The police reports submitted in the aftermath of the Los Angeles police beat-
ing of Rodney King did not identify any of the three civilian witnesses present at the
scene, including Mr. King's two passengers and the driver of the vehicle whose loca-
tion forced King to stop his car. The police simply told the latter to leave. Telephone
Interview with Terry White, Assistant District Attorney, Los Angeles District Attorney's
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sobriety,255 discrepancies in witness descriptions of the perpetrator,25 6
discrepancies between such descriptions and the defendant's appear-
ance, any alibi offered by the defendant, and the identity of any alibi
witnesses. Spaces could be provided for these items in standard report
forms, and explanations required for their omission. As we enter the age
of computerized reporting, these requirements can be enforced by ap-
propriately designed software.257 Compared to more global approaches,
specifying the required information would have the disadvantage of un-
derinclusiveness, but it would offer more guidance to the police. It would
also facilitate training, internal monitoring, communication with prose-
cutors, and enforcement.2 58 Most important, limiting the reporting duty
to specific categories of exculpatory information would reduce the threat
to police interests and therefore increase the likelihood that the reform
would be accepted.
However, even this modest reform would prove difficult to enforce.
Police would probably resist the change. From their point of view, the
duty to report specified categories of potentially exculpatory information
known to them would create pressure to conduct more detailed investiga-
tions in order to confirm or negate the exculpatory value of that informa-
tion. For example, an officer testifying in court whose report stated that
the victim did not appear sober would be vulnerable for not investigating
how long or how much the victim had been drinking, or the victim's level
of impairment. Similarly, the officer would be vulnerable for reporting
the defendant's alibi but failing to check it out promptly, or for recording
the names of eyewitnesses but never taking their statements. As a result,
police might have to choose between devoting even more effort to the
investigation of exculpatory leads, and suffering embarrassment (or
worse) once the case reaches court. Although this pressure might be
countered by jury instructions explaining the limited goal of police inves-
Office (July 28, 1992); see also People v. Powell, No. BA035498, (Cal. Super. Ct. April
30, 1992) (LEXIS, Cal library, LAPD file) at *44 (Closing Argument for the Prosecu-
tion, First Close by Attorney Terry White). An enforced requirement that the police
report the identity of civilian witnesses to crime would have complicated their task of
fabricating details of the beating incident.
255. As required in the Atlanta offense report form. See supra text accompanying
note 137.
256. See supra text accompanying note 143.
257. In the future, manually prepared notes and reports will likely be displaced by
electronic reporting. See Robert Garcia, "Garbage In, Gospel Out": Criminal Discovery,
Computer Reliability and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. Ruv. 1043, 1076-77 (1991) (Los
Angeles Police Department studying use of lap top computers to prepare police re-
ports in squad cars). The central computer could be programmed to reject reports
that omit required information without explanation. I thank my former colleague Avi
Soifer for this thought.
258. One might argue presumptive culpability if the police violate "normal prac-
tice" by failing to gather and/or record potentially exculpatory information that they
have been specifically trained to report.
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tigation, it might still make police reluctant to report mandatory catego-
ries of exculpatory evidence in the first place.
In some proportion of cases, defendants would claim that the police
disregarded their obligations to record, preserve, or report the specified
information. Courts would then determine, case-by-case, whether a viola-
tion occurred, and if so, what sanction to apply.25 9 The choice of sanc-
tion would probably turn upon familiar criteria: materiality, prejudice,
and police culpability. For violations consisting of failure to record or
preserve facts that were only potentially exculpatory, such as witness iden-
tities, courts would have to decide whether to impose sanctions in the
face of uncertain materiality and prejudice: should some degree of indi-
vidual or collective260 police culpability be required? Another significant
variable, the burden of proof, would also have to be decided. Unless
courts radically departed from their past approaches to these issues, case-
by-case enforcement would probably benefit few defendants, and do little
to induce police compliance with the law.
More promising than case-by-case review, a court could require police
administrators to take specific steps designed to implement the court's
order, such as the amendment of report forms, training, and supervision.
While this might be most effective, it would require a greater degree of
ongoing judicial involvement in police administration than most courts
would find comfortable.
B. Administrative Reforms and the Police-Prosecutor Relationship
The Circuit Court in Palmer deferred to the CPD and the Cook
County State's Attorney's Office to carry out their "combined responsibil-
ity" to safeguard defendants' Brady rights, free of judicial "meddling."26 1
In light of the minimal protection afforded defendants by judicial reme-
dies, reliance on administrative action to ensure the reporting of exculpa-
tory evidence deserves consideration.
Can we look to prosecutors, who are directly responsible to the courts
for disclosing exculpatory evidence to the defense, to lead the police to
change their reporting practices? This would require prosecutors both to
desire greater police reporting of exculpatory evidence, and to have the
ability to get the police to change.
Scanty, one-sided police reports deprive prosecutors of information
they need to perform effectively both as "quasi-judicial" seekers of jus-
259. Possible sanctions include dismissal, continuance, missing witness instruction,
witness preclusion, and reversal. See supra text accompanying notes 236-45.
260. Whether the police department takes seriously its obligation to comply with
investigative requirements, by adequate training and monitoring programs, might be
considered. Prosecutorial efforts are also relevant. See supra text accompanying note
239 and infra Part IV(B).
261. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 578 (7th Cir. 1985). In the court's
view, this is an "inherently internal and discretionary function." Id.
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tice,2 62 and as "adversarial advocates." On both counts, prosecutors have
an interest in receiving reports that contain all of the information needed
to decide the proper charge and to evaluate the prosecutive merit of the
case. 26 3 To negotiate pleas and prepare for trial intelligently, a prosecu-
tor needs access to exculpatory facts and other details relevant to estab-
lishing or negating potential defenses.
In practice, however, most prosecutors subordinate their interest in
exculpatory evidence to adversarial concerns. Influenced by a "convic-
tion psychology," prosecutors widely resist their duties under Brady.2 64 A
prosecutor might want to know exculpatory evidence that was so strong
that it was convincing of the defendant's innocence. Also, to avoid sur-
prise, the prosecutor would want to know whatever exculpatory facts the
defense could prove. In most cases, however, the evidence will be neither
so convincing nor capable of proof by the defense. In these types of cases
then, the reporting of more exculpatory evidence would simply create a
dilemma-to disclose or not-that most prosecutors would rather avoid.
Therefore, although some prosecutors might complain about insuffi-
ciently detailed police reports, as a group they would probably not favor
more reporting of exculpatory evidence, especially if such evidence be-
came available for use by defense attorneys. On the contrary, some prose-
cutors have been known to encourage police to write vague reports, in
order to leave the police witnesses more "running room" in court.265
262. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice Can
Prosecutors DoJustic?, 44 VANm. L. REv. 45 (1991); Fisher, supra note 24, at 208-09.
263. This view of the report was adopted by the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in its Standard 12.9, "Prosecutor Relationship
with the Police and with Other Agencies of the Criminal justice System":
The prosecutor should develop for the use of the police a basic police report
form that includes all relevant information about the offense and the of-
fender necessary for charging, plea negotiations, and trial.... The police
report form is the single most important document in the prosecutor's case
file. Prosecutors ... rely on the.., report to identify necessary witnesses, to
familiarize themselves with the facts of the case, and to identify the problems
that may arrive at trial. Since the police report form is the basic prosecutive
document, it should be designed by the prosecutor to meet his requirements
and not by the police based on their interpretation of the prosecutor's
requirements.
A well-designed report form should require police officers to detail all of
the evidence which supports each element of the offense, the relevant sur-
rounding circumstances, and all known witnesses and their addresses.
NATIONAL AnvisoRY COMM'N ON CRIMINALJusTICE STANDARDS AND GoAls, REPORT ON
COURTS 247, 248 (1973) (project of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration)
[hereinafter REPORT ON COURTS].
264. See, e.g., Capra, supra note 87, at 405-06; Rosen, supra note 215, at 732.
265. Orfield, supra note 19, at 101, quotes a Chicago prosecutor: "The [police]
report is vague. The report is written that way for a reason. A good police report is
written in such a way that the officer can expand any way and anything. And it's true,
we do tell them how to do that." Id.
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Even if prosecutors wanted more reporting of exculpatory evidence, it
is doubtful whether, on their own, most could bring about change. By
and large, state and local police agencies operate independently of prose-
cutors, and answer to different constituencies. 266 Therefore, the ability
of prosecutors to change police reporting practices is more often a mat-
ter of persuasion than command.267 In some jurisdictions, it seems, the
opposite is true. This is demonstrated by a study of two California juris-
dictions (A and B) with contrasting police investigative styles.268 Prosecu-
tors in office A enforced strict charging standards, rejecting police files
that lacked persuasively detailed reports. Police in office A responded by
filing reports containing, e.g., verbatim accounts of victim, witness, and
suspect statements, including multiple accounts "so that inconsistencies
among the statements would be * noted."269 Prosecution office B had
more relaxed charging criteria, "accommodat[ing] to routine police...
practice [s] of presenting minimal information to substantiate the filing of
a case."2 70 Researchers found a significantly lower rate of dismissals and
charge bargaining in jurisdiction A than B, but "no consistent conclu-
sions regarding case disposition or final sentences."271 The authors also
found no support for the argument that detailed police reports will,
through defense discovery, "facilitate the impeachment of prosecution
witnesses, frequently policemen."272
The California study suggests that, at least under some conditions,
prosecutors can and will effectively insist on more detailed police reports
and the inclusion of exculpatory evidence. Exercising that power, both
by negotiation and by active participation in police training,2 73 would al-
leviate the problems exposed in Palmer. Where prosecutors lack that
power, they can still improve their ability to comply with Brady by inform-
ing themselves in detail about local police record-keeping and reporting
practices, and by attempting to get the police to preserve and give them
access to all records, both "formal" and "informal." They should be re-
quired to make these efforts by court rules and amendments to the rules
266. McIntyre, supra note 24, at 203-09, 220-27. In exceptional circumstances, such
as white collar criminal investigations, prosecutors directly employ and supervise po-
lice investigators.
267. It is telling that the National Advisory Commission's proposal, supra note 263,
that police reporting forms should be designed by prosecutors, is not reflected in the
Commission's standards for the police. See Report on Police, supra note 97, at 570-74.
268. GREENWOOD, supra note 93, ch. 11.
269. Id. at 172.
270. Id. at 169.
271. Id. at 189.
272. Id. at 172 n.3.
273. The ABA STANDARDS FOR THE PROSEcUTION FuNnoN, Standard 3-2.7, enjoins
prosecutors "to aid in training police in the performance of their function in accord-
ance with law," and many prosecutors do so. See, e.g., Robert Wennerholm, Legal Un-
derstanding of Police Officers-The Continuing Challenge for Prosecutors, 25 THE
PROSECUTOR 11, 14 (1991).
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of professional responsibility.2 74 Achieving this might not be easy. Re-
porting procedures differ from department to department, and most
prosecutors must deal with multiple departments and police agencies.2 75
Reviewing "informal" records, like handwritten field notes, takes more
work than reviewing typewritten reports.2 76 Also, some police will not
preserve and/or transmit complete records. Despite these difficulties,
the alternative-prosecutorial ignorance and passivity-invites systematic
suppression of exculpatory evidence, at a high cost to defendants and
society.
The possibility also exists that more police agencies will voluntarily
reform their reporting practices. Reforms inspired by the drive for effi-
cient crime control, imposed from within police bureaucracies, would
more likely succeed than changes perceived as meant to benefit criminal
defendants, imposed from outside. As discussed earlier, law enforcement
leaders recognize that more thorough police investigation and reporting
would result in better crime control.277 Because more complete police
reports would inevitably reveal more exculpatory as well as inculpatory
facts, the change would also benefit innocent defendants. However, con-
sidering the powerful disincentives for police to increase their investiga-
tive responsibilities or to report exculpatory evidence, whether they will
initiate or welcome significant change is questionable.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The impact of police investigation and reporting practices on the ad-
ministration of criminal justice has not been sufficiently studied. The
available data suggest that intentional deception is more widespread than
the legal literature reflects, a fact that should color our view of all police
reports. However, most often a report will be misleading because, while
274. Language could be used from the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTIcE (2d
ed. 1980). For example, Standard 11-2.2(c) provides: "The prosecutor shall ensure
that a flow of information is maintained between the various investigative personnel
and the prosecutor's office sufficient tW place within the prosecutor's possession or
control all material and information relevant to the accused and the offense
charged."
Although none of the ABA rules of professional responsibility refer to Standard
11-2.2(c), court rules or decisions in several states have enforced its mandate. See, e.g.,
COLO. CT. R. CrM. P. 16(I) (b) (4), applied in People v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163,
167-69 (Colo. 1990); ILL. CT. R. CRim. P. 412(f); WAsH. SUPER. CT. CRrM. R. 4.7(a) (4),
construed in State v. DeWilde, 529 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also Long
v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 876-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Wold v. State, 204 N.W.2d 482,
486-87 & n.2c (Wis. 1973).
275. For example, in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, the District Attorney's Of-
fice prosecutes cases from 54 police departments.
276. Some police write notes on napkins and matchbook covers. Palmershows that
allowing such documents to remain in the personal possession of police, or in "unoffi-
cial" files, risks loss or suppression of exculpatory evidence.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
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inculpatory facts are investigated, recorded, and reported, exculpatory ev-
idence is not. This practice serves police interests in resource conserva-
tion, self-protection, and partisanship, but "fundamentally impairs the
functioning of the fact finding process and its ability to determine guilt or
innocence correctly."278 To remedy this, the police should be required
to report certain limited categories of potentially exculpatory facts known
to them. Although this requirement would entail extra costs, 279 it could
be probably be implemented without destroying police effectiveness as
peacekeepers. Expanded reporting of exculpatory facts would not pre-
vent lying in police reports, but it would make that practice more diffi-
cult. In the case of truthful reports, a more thorough, balanced account
would result.
Achieving this change will be difficult. Reforms by police agencies
themselves would have the greatest chance of success, but are unlikely to
occur. Prosecutors are probably no more motivated than the police to
see more exculpatory evidence reported. But they do have an obligation
to learn all of the exculpatory facts that the police possess in a given case.
Without that knowledge, prosecutors cannot meet their legal and ethical
responsibilities to give discovery to the defense, to avoid the presentation
of perjured evidence, and to perform other important functions. There-
fore, rules of procedure and ethics should require prosecutors to famil-
iarize themselves with police investigative and record-keeping
procedures, to press the police to report specified categories of poten-
tially exculpatory facts, and to make good faith efforts to ensure their
access to all relevant records.
As a practical matter, no change will occur without the efforts of de-
fense attorneys. But their ability to force change in police behavior is also
quite limited. Taking a lesson from Jones,280 their first task is to docu-
ment both the formal rules governing local police investigation and re-
ports, and the "working rules" followed in practice. Departmental forms,
bulletins and training materials will reveal the former, including the uni-
versal instructions to take and preserve detailed field notes, and to pro-
duce "complete" reports which contain "all relevant information."2 '
Actual police practices can be elicited in evidentiary hearings.
Once documented, local practices vis-a-vis gathering, recording, and
reporting exculpatory evidence can be used in various ways. One is for
defense attorneys to educate judges and other decision makers in the
one-sidedness, and therefore the unreliability, of reports. As a result,
278. Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation, supra note 23, at
835.
279. See supra text following note 258 (expanded duty to report potentially excul-
patory evidence could pressure police to conduct more detailed investigations) and
infra text accompanying notes 288-90 (shift in adversary balance).
280. Prior to Jones, the Chicago defense bar was apparently ignorant of the CPD
street fe system. See supra text accompanying note 186.
281. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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courts might place less faith in the objectivity of police reports than they
sometimes do now. 28 2 Within the limits of discovery law and practice in
each jurisdiction, defense attorneys could draft subpoenas and discovery
requests specifically to cover "informal" documents such as field notes.
Where feasible, they could bring Palmer-style suits in state court, seeking
systemic, equitable relief based on defendants' right of access to exculpa-
tory evidence on both constitutional and non-constitutional grounds.
The relief sought should include ordering the police to record specific
categories of exculpatory evidence, and to preserve and transmit all rele-
vant records to the prosecutors. Winning either type of relief, but espe-
cially the former, will be difficult under existing case law. It will require
convincing a court that the evils to be avoided, and the inadequacy of
more conventional remedies, justify this much intrusion into police and
prosecutorial functions.
VI. AFTERTHOUGHT: REPORTING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND THE
ADvEsPARY PROCESS
Focusing attention on the processes of police investigation illumi-
nates the relationship between police investigation and the adversary pro-
cess. According to one view, police investigation-including the
gathering, recording and reporting of relevant facts-not only should
be,288 but normally is, "neutral." For example, Professor Samuel Gross
describes our system of criminal law enforcement as an investigatory-ad-
versarial "hybrid," characterized by investigative neutrality which shifts
into adversariness only if and when the guilty-plea process breaks down.
Until then, the police work as "quasijudicial investigators," attempting to
"uncover the facts, determine the truth, and bring the criminal to punish-
ment."284 In Professor John Mitchell's contrasting view, the shift to ad-
versariness occurs much earlier: "Once an arrest has been made, or the
'prime suspect' determined, the police abdicate the role of neutral inves-
282. The fate of "dropsy" testimony might be relevant. Although the publicity
given to police perjury practices in "dropsy" cases has not eliminated that abuse, con-
cern thatjudges will react skeptically to dropsy testimony has probably curbed it. See,
e.g., Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 87 (1968) (empirical evidence shows changes in police
testimony regarding probable cause to'seize narcotics after Mapp decision); KORN-
BLUM, supra note 68, at 80-81 (noting the greater use of fictitious informants as a
consequence of courts losing faith in "dropsy" testimony). See supra note 75 for a
definition of "dropsy" testimony.
283. Writing in the wake of the 1931 Wickersham Commission Report, Ernest Hop-
kins identified as the principal source of police perjury (and of the intentional "sup-
pression" of exculpatory facts), the officer's "customary abandonment of his legal role
as a finder of fact, and his assumption of the role of advocate," usually for the prose-
cution. HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 278. In Hopkins's view, the police, like judges, are
meant to be neutral players in the adversary battle between prosecution and defense.
Id. at 278-79; see also text accompanying note 23.
284. Gross, supra note 198, at 434.
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tigators and become advocates of the prosecution team."285 "Advocate" is
perhaps an overstatement, but Professor Mitchell correctly identifies the
stage at which the police acquire both a positive interest in promptly clos-
ing the investigation, and a negative interest in supplying evidence that
might prevent a conviction. These interests strongly affect the scope and
depth of further investigation, and decisions to record and report already
known exculpatory facts. Thus, reports by American police differ from
those produced under a truly neutral system of investigation, such as re-
portedly exists in France and Germany, where the police are required to
investigate and record exculpatory as well as inculpatory facts. 28 6 In our
system, the police investigation and report are themselves, to some ex-
tent, artifacts of the adversary process.287
The early loss or suppression of exculpatory facts undermines ajustify-
ing premise of our adversary system: that the defense and prosecution
are evenly matched.288 Whatever validity might generally attach to this
premise, it fails at the stage of fact investigation. In most cases, if the
police do not conduct an objective, neutral, and thorough investigation,
no one will. In most cases they do not, and no one does. This defect
seriously impairs the system's ability to base judgments of guilt on all the
relevant evidence, and undermines its claim to fairness.
However, just as the present bias in police investigation and reporting
affects the adversary balance, so would the changes recommended in this
article. Consider how increasing the amount of potentially exculpatory
information in police reports would affect criminal proceedings. In
cross-examination before a jury, defense attorneys could effectively ex-
ploit this material. Even trivial, remote, or speculative information might
gain importance simply by virtue of its inclusion in the police report. If
discoverable by the defense, and available for use at trial, police reports
peppered with alibis, inconsistent descriptions, and discrediting facts
285. John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old
Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293, 304 (1980). Professor Mitchell continues: "Such advo-
cacy may lead police to overlook or negligently destroy exculpatory evidence or to
suppress evidence in their possession which is helpful to the accused." Id. at 304.
286. See John H. Langbein & Lloyd. L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE LJ. 1549, 1554, 1562-63 & n.51 (1978); GERMAN CODE
CRmm. PRO. §§ 136 (II), 160(11) (Gerhard O.W. Mueller, ed., 1965).
287. The law intermittently denies and acknowledges this insight. Compare United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554 (1980) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
543-44 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (custodial questioning justified by interest in
prompt discovery of exculpatory evidence for the purpose of "clearing" and releasing
innocent suspects) with United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.
1980) (exclusion of police reports from hearsay exceptions under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8) (B) because police reports "lack sufficient guarantees of trustworthi-
ness because they are made in an adversary setting and [are] likely to be used in litiga-
tion."). As one Congressman remarked in hearings on the Rule, "[piolice reports...
tend to be one-sided and self-serving." 120 CONG. REc. 40, 891 (1974) (statement of
Rep. Hungate). See also supra note 173.
288. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 694 & n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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about the star prosecution witness would result in more dismissals,
favorable pleas, and acquittals. Some of these outcomes would be de-
served, others not. Would this shift in the adversary balance give too
many defendants an undeserved windfall?
Thoughtful observers of the system might differ in their answers to
this question.2 8 9 But even those who oppose shifting the balance in the
defendant's favor should not reject the goal of expanded police report-
ing. The desired balance of adversary advantage should be sought in reg-
ulating defense access to or use of reported exculpatory evidence at
trial.2 90 For the sake of both innocent defendants and the efficient ad-
ministration ofjustice, the present system, in which exculpatory evidence
is systematically lost or suppressed, should be changed.
289. Presumably, increased reporting of exculpatory evidence would produce
some increase in the number of innocent defendants who, like George Jones, would
be saved from wrongful conviction, and also an increase in factually guilty defendants
who would escape "rightful" conviction. Even if we could know how many defendants
would fall into each category, it would be difficult to know how to weigh them against
each other. How many "false negatives" are justified by saving just one innocent de-
fendant from capital punishment?
290. Allowing the defense access and use, but permitting the court to caution the
jury as to the police duty to report certain information, regardless of its potential
insignificance, would preserve legitimate defense rights to compulsory process and
confrontation of opposing witnesses. But see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-
61 (1987) (government duty to produce confidential but potentially exculpatory files





Please read the following paragraph and respond to the questions be-
low by checking the most appropriate answer.
Incident.
V is reportedly robbed at knifepoint in the doorway of a building on
an urban residential street by a sole assailant. When police respond, V,
who is obviously drunk, describes the perpetrator as a white male, about
5'7", wearing khaki pants, a red sweatshirt, and sneakers. The description
is broadcast. Several other people are sitting or standing on stoops in the
vicinity, watching the police.
Twenty minutes later other officers stop D in the courtyard of a
nearby housing project, where he is standing with two other persons. D is
5'9", moustached, wearing khaki pants, sneakers, a purple zippered jacket
with a white emblem on the breast and "Tigers" in large white letters on
the back, and a red "Tigers" baseball cap. In response to questions D
says, "I've been here for the last two hours. Ask them." "That's right," says
one of the other two.
V is brought to the stop scene, where he identifies D as the robber. D
is arrested.
Questions.
(A) In practice, do you think the police incident/arrest report in
these circumstances would contain the following information, and (B) do
you think a proper police report should contain it? If you do not know or
have no opinion please leave the answer blank.
A. B.
(REPORT WOULD CONTAIN?) (REPORT SHOUID CONTAIN?.
USUALLY SOMETIMES RARELY YES NO
1. Victim's initial description of
perpetrator?
2. That the victim was drunk?
3. Names and addresses of the
bystanders who witnessed the
incident or saw the assailant:
A. If the information is
volunteered?
B. If the information is not
volunteered, but must be
gathered?
4. Description of defendant's
iacket and cap?
Fall, 1993]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
If you have indicated that you would not expect the arresting police
officer to include certain information in the arrest report, why do you
think that is so? (Check as many reasons as apply):
- The police do not have the time to gather/report such details.
- The police do not want to give ammunition to defense lawyers.
- The police are not supposed to report such details-thatjob is
for the detectives or the defense lawyer.
- Once the police decide to arrest someone, they don't want to
see the person go free.
- The police don't want to invite a law suit for arresting the wrong
person.
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B. Table: Combined Police Responses: County Two and Quantico Class
WOULD iT BE INCLUDED?
SHOULD iT BE
QUESTION INCLUDED? USUALLY SOMETIMES RARELY
Question 1: Victim's initial description of Yes: 15/17 17/17 0 0
perpetrator? (88%) (100%)
No: 0
Question 2: That the victim was drunk? Yes: 14/17 12/17 3/17 2/17
(82%) (71%) (18%) (12%)
No: 2/17
(12%)
Question 3 Names and addresses of the
bystanders who witnessed the incident or
saw the assailant:




B. If the information was not Yes: 15/17 14/17 0 2/17
volunteered, but must be gathered? (88%) (82%) (12%)
No: 1/17
(6%)
Question 4. Description of the Yes: 15/17 14/17 3/17 0
defendant's jacket and cap (88%) (82%) (18%)
No:: 1/17
(6%)
Question 5: Names and addresses of the Yes: 6/17 13/17 4/17 0
two persons in defendant's company (94%) (76%) (24%)
when arrested
Question & Defendant's alibi statement Yes: 16/17 15/17 2/17 0
(94%) (88%) (12%)
Question 7 Other person's statement Yes: 16/17 14/17 3/17 0
supporting defendant's alibi (94%) (82%) (18%)
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C. City One Incident Report Form .
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